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"GOD SAID TO ABRAHAM/KILL ME A SON": WHY THE
INSANITY DEFENSE AND THE INCOMPETENCY STATUS ARE
COMPATIBLE WITH AND REQUIRED BY THE CONVENTION ON
THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES AND BASIC
PRINCIPLES OF THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
Michael L. Perlin, Esq.*
INTRODUCTION
The conditions of treatment of forensic patients-their institutionalization in
psychiatric facilities, their confinement in such facilities, and their possible
pathways out-has always been stunningly under-considered, not just in academic
literature and case law, but also in the discussions and negotiations that led to the
final draft of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ("CRPD").I
In an important book written about the "back story" of the negotiations, the role of
Non-Governmental Organizations ("NGO"), and the back-and-forth that led to the
CRPD's promulgation, there is virtually no mention of the specific and unique
issues that are raised by the institutionalization of forensic patients.2 Nor is there
any mention whatsoever of the multiple routes that lead to individuals' entering
such facilities-some because they are currently seen as incompetent to stand trial,
some because they have been deemed permanently incompetent to stand trial,
some because they are being evaluated after having filed notice of seeking to plead
the insanity defense, some because they have been found not guilty by reason of
insanity, and, in some nations, some because they have been transferred after
3conviction from prisons.
* Professor Emeritus of Law; Founding Director, International Mental Disability Law Reform Project, New
York Law School; and Co-Founder, Mental Disability Law and Policy Associates. An earlier version of this
Article was presented as a keynote address to the fourth international therapeutic jurisprudence conference at the
University of Auckland, NZ, on September 4, 2015. I wish to thank Chris Slobogin, Eleanore Fritze, Douglas
Mossman, Henry Dlugacz, David Wexler, Shelley Kierstead, Maya Sabatello, Debbie Dorfman, Heather Ellis
Cucolo, Mehgan Gallagher, Ken Gallant, and Penny Weller for their insightful and helpful comments and
suggestions. I am particularly indebted to Eleanore for sharing so many Australian source documents with me. I
also wish to thank Katey Thom and Warren Brookbanks for inviting me to present a version of this Article as one
of the keynotes at the University of Auckland conference. © 2017, Michael L. Perlin.
1. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106 (Dec. 6, 2006) [hereinafter CRPD].
2. See HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABLITY ADVOCACY (Maya Sabatello & Marianne Schulze eds., 2014); see also
Maya Sabatello, Where Have the Rights ofForensic Patients Gone?, 109 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 77, 78 (2015)
("[F]orensic patients ... remained largely invisible throughout the drafting process.").
3. See generally 3 MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABLITY LAW: CIVw AND
CRIMINAL §§ 13-1 to 14-3 (3d ed. 2016).
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In an earlier book chapter that I wrote with Meredith Schriver,4 we argued that
most of the case law that had developed about institutionalized persons "ignores
forensic patients entirely," and noted that "[e]ven in this hidden world of those
institutionalized because of psychiatric disability (or alleged disability), forensic
patients . . . remain the most hidden."5 Schriver and I also alleged that there was
virtually no significant opposition to this extra level of social isolation.
It was "just fine with most of those who had been involved in the patients' rights
revolution that has restructured mental health care around the world." 6 It was "fine
to the advocacy groups that came forward at this time, since the existence of a
forensic 'world' could be used as evidence that there was a causal relationship
between mental illness (or intellectual disability) and 'dangerousness."' 7 It was
also "just fine" to the "lawyers who brought the bulk of the first generation of
public interest cases since one of the significant underpinnings of the initial right to
liberty/least restrictive alternative civil rights suits was that the plaintiff had never
been 'alleged to have committed any crime,'"" and to the "state hospital system,
since it was clear that if it appeared that this population was being released or
4. Michael L. Perlin & Meredith R. Schriver, "You that Hide Behind Walls": The Relationship Between the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Convention Against Torture and the Treatment of
Institutionalized Forensic Patients, in CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & HUMANITARIAN LAw, AM. UNIV. WASHINGTON
COLL. OF LAW, TORTURE IN HEALTHCARE SETTINGS: REFLECTIONS ON THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON TORTURE'S 2013
THEMATIC REPORT 195 (2013); see also Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights and Institutional Forensic
Psychiatry: The Core Issues, in THE USE OF COERCIVE MEASURES IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIC CARE: LEGAL, ETHICAL
AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES 9 (Birgit Vbllm & Norbert Nedopil eds., 2016) [hereinafter Perlin, The Core Issues]
(noting that forensic patients have traditionally been hidden from public view, the legal system, and the
mental-health system).
5. Perlin & Schriver, supra note 4, at 197. This is not an issue limited to the United States. On the disregard for
the dignity of forensic patients in Austria, see, for example, Independent Monitoring Committee for the
Implementation of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Forensic Commitment-
Statement on the Current Situation and Prevention at 4-5 (Jan. 19, 2015) (discussing "a disregard for dignity").
Paradoxically, this comes at a time at which the numbers of forensic patients are increasing. See, e.g., William H.
Fisher, Jeffrey L. Geller & John A. Pandiani, The Changing Role of the State Psychiatric Hospital, 28 HEALTH
AFF. 676, 679 (2009); Claire Marie Hagan, Sheltering Psychiatric Patients from the DeShaney Storm: A Proposed
Analysis for Determining Affirmative Duties to Voluntary Patients, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 725, 756 (2013)
("State hospitals are also devoting more beds to forensic patients who come from the criminal system." (citing
SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FUNDING AND
CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE MENTAL HEALTH AGENCIES, 2009 at 71 (2009) ("Since 1993, state psychiatric hospital
expenditures have increasingly been applied to forensic services, jumping from 10.7 percent of total state
psychiatric hospital expenditures in 1993 to 26 percent in 2007."))). Numbers of forensic patients are increasing
not just in the United States, but also in other nations. See, e.g., Sheilagh Hodgins, Rtidiger Mtiller-Isberner &
Jean-Franqois Allaire, Attempting to Understand the Increase in the Numbers of Forensic Beds in Europe: A
Multi-Site Study of Patients in Forensic and General Psychiatric Services, 5 INT'L J. FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH
173, 173 (2006).
6. Perlin, The Core Issues, supra note 4, at 11.
7. Id. This relationship has often been extraordinarily strained. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "Half-Wracked
Prejudice Leaped Forth": Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed as It Did,
10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 30 n. 158 (1999).
8. Perlin, The Core Issues, supra note 4, at 11 (citing Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1096 (E.D. Wis.
1972)).
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deinstitutionalized, there would be a predictable public outcry." 9 Importantly, it
was also "just fine" to "prosecutors and police officials since it insured that this
population would remain locked up indefinitely, as it always had been."o As a
result of all of this, the status quo remained for about forty years, and the "patients'
rights revolution" has had very little impact on those in forensic facilities.
I believe that this is still true, but I fear that, paradoxically, instead of things
getting better in the future, they may get far worse if the General Comments
("GC") to Articles 12 and 14 of the CRPD are to gain traction, 1 2 and if those
Comments lead to the abolition of the insanity defense or the incompetency status.
The GCs unequivocally state that "declarations of unfitness to stand trial and the
detention of persons based on that declaration" violate Article 14,13 and that
"recognition of the legal capacity of persons with disabilities requires abolishing a
defence based on the negation of criminal responsibility because of the existence
of a mental or intellectual disability." 1 4 Such policy pronouncements of U.N. treaty
bodies, in the form of GCs or recommendations, are not considered binding
international law, but are often viewed as "helpful interpretations of the treaty at
issue from recognized authorities, which can guide national policies in a rights-
affirming direction."15
9. Id. (citing Raymond A. Lemay, Deinstitutionalization of People with Developmental Disabilities: A Review
of the Literature, 28 CAN. J. COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH 181, 181 (2009)).
10. Id. When I was a deputy public defender in New Jersey, I filed a class-action suit, Dixon v. Cahill, which
resulted in a ruling that the indefinite incarceration of individuals in the Vroom Building, New Jersey's
maximum-security facility for the "criminally insane," violated Jackson, and that individual hearings were
warranted for each inmate. Dixon v. Cahill, No. L30977/y-71 P.W. (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1973), reprinted in
PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 19-8; see also Michael L. Perlin, "For the Misdemeanor Outlaw": The Impact
of the ADA on the Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REv. 193,
206-07, 207 n.94 (2000) [hereinafter Perlin, Misdemeanor Outlaw] (discussing Dixon v. Cahill and applying Due
Process Clause to incompetent-to-stand-trial defendants). The courts ultimately found that 185 of the 225 patients
in that facility were illegally detained. See Michael L. Perlin, "May You Stay Forever Young": Robert Sadoff and
the History ofMental Disability Law, 33 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 236, 236-37 (2005).
11. See Perlin & Schriver, supra note 4, at 197-98.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 124-57. See also Andrew Wolman, Abortion in Korea: A Human Rights
Perspective on the Current Debate over Enforcement of the Laws Prohibiting Abortion, 9 J. INT'L Bus. & L. 153,
163 (2010) (citing Kerstin Mechlem, Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights, 42 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 905, 924 (2009)); see also, e.g., Michael O'Flaherty, The Concluding Observations of United
Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 6 HUM. Rrs. L. REv. 27, 33 (2006).
13. Comm. on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Statement on Article 14 of the Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities (Sept. 2014) [hereinafter CRPD, Statement on Article 14], http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewslD=15183&LanglD=E. The Committee has also criticized indi-
vidual governments for maintaining procedures that permit a defendant to be deemed "unfit" to stand trial and
subsequently detained. See, e.g., Comm. on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding Observations on
the Initial Report of New Zealand 133, CRPD/C/NZL/CO/1 (Oct. 31, 2014).
14. U.N. Human Rights Council, Thematic Study by the United Nation High Commissioner for Human Rights
on Enhancing Awareness and Understanding of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ¶ 47,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/48, at 15 (Jan. 26, 2009), http://www.un.org/disabilities/documents/reports/ohchr/A.HRC.
10.48AEV.pdf.
15. Wolman, supra note 12, at 163 (citing Mechlem, supra note 12, at 924).
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These Comments have been embraced by some members of the disability-rights
community, " and the abolitionist movement is growing.1 7 This position is wrong-
headed in every possible way. If adopted, it will make a mockery of any modicum
of fair-trial rights for the population in question, and will likely lead to torture of
this population in the jails and prisons in which it will languish." The statement in
the GCs-"that declarations of unfitness to stand trial and the detention of persons
based on that declaration is contrary to article 14 of the [CRPD] since it deprives
the person of his or her right to due process and safeguards that are applicable to
every defendant" 9-is the single most wrongheaded (and potentially destructive)
statement uttered by any supporter of the CRPD since its initial drafting.2 0 The
abolition of this status will further enhance the likelihood that morally and
16. See, e.g., Tina Minkowitz, Some Thoughts on Insanity Defense, MAD IN AM. (July 12, 2014) [hereinafter
Minkowitz, Some Thoughts], http://www.madinamerica.com/2014/07/thoughts-insanity-defense/; Tina Minkow-
itz, Rethinking Criminal Responsibility from a Critical Disability Perspective: The Abolition of Insanity/
Incapacity Acquittals and Unfitness to Plead, and Beyond, 23 GRIFFITH L. REV. 434 (2014) [hereinafter
Minkowitz, Rethinking Criminal Responsiblity]; WORLD NETWORK OF USERS AND SURVIVORS OF PSYCHIATRY,
IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL FOR THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABLITIES
(2008), http://www.un.org/disabilities/documents/COPWNUSP%20CRPD%2OManual.doc.
17. See Charles O'Mahony, Impact ofHuman Rights Approach in Member States'Legislation: Legal Capacity
in Ireland, ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docld= 15773&langld=en.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 205-08 (noting that persons with mental disabilities are regularly
brutalized and tortured in prison settings).
19. CRPD, Statement on Article 14, supra note 13.
20. Before I became a professor, I spent thirteen years as a lawyer representing persons with mental
disabilities, including three years during which my focus was primarily on such individuals charged with crimes.
In this role, when I was deputy public defender in Mercer County (Trenton), New Jersey, I represented several
hundred individuals at New Jersey's "maximum security hospital for the criminally insane," both in individual
cases and in a class action, Dixon v. Cahill, which implemented the then-recent U.S. Supreme Court case of
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). See supra note 10. Jackson had declared unconstitutional a state policy
that allowed for the indefinite commitment of a pretrial detainee in maximum-security forensic facilities if it was
unlikely that he would regain his capacity to stand trial in the "foreseeable future."
I continued to represent this population for a decade in my later positions as director of the New Jersey Division
of Mental Health Advocacy and Special Counsel to the New Jersey Public Advocate. Also, as a public defender, I
represented, at trial, many defendants who were incompetent to stand trial and others who, although competent,
pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. See generally, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Mental Patient Advocacy by a
Public Advocate, 54 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 169 (1982). Finally, during the time that I directed the Federal Litigation
Clinic at New York Law School, I filed a brief on behalf of appellant (amicus Committee on the Fundamental
Rights and Equality ofEx-Patients) inAke v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (finding right of indigent defendant to
independent psychiatrist to aid in presentation of insanity defense).
These experiences gave me, I think, a unique perspective on the issues at hand. There is no question that the
conditions in which these individuals were housed were horrific-they shocked the conscience and were about as
counter-therapeutic as one could imagine. But to think that the best remedy was to abolish the only realistic hope
they had to avoid the even-more-brutal conditions of state prison is, to me, bizarre. It is even more bizarre since, to
the best of my knowledge, none of the commentary that I discuss in this paper even considers the reality that
raising the incompetency status is in no way a concession of factual guilt. See Michael L. Perlin, "Everything's a
Little Upside Down, as a Matter of Fact the Wheels Have Stopped": The Fraudulence of the Incompetency
Evaluation Process, 4 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 239, 246 (2004) [hereinafter Perlin, Upside Down] ("Although
there is nothing in the invocation of the incompetency status that at all concedes factual guilt ... it is assumed by
all that the defendant did, in fact, commit the crime.").
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factually innocent people will be convicted and imprisoned,2 1 likely for far longer
than persons without mental disabilities for like offenses.22 Also, factually guilty
defendants will be robbed of their opportunities to make important choices such as
choosing to knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently enter into a plea bargain.23
This Article argues that the interpretations of the GCs ignore the rest of the
CRPD and other prevailing international human-rights law, make no theoretical or
conceptual sense, disregard the history of how society has treated persons with
serious mental disabilities who are charged with crimes, and will lead to torture of
this population in prison, at the hands of both prison guards and other prisoners.
This position also contradicts every precept of therapeutic jurisprudence ("TJ").24
In his thoughtful piece that seeks to integrate the traditional insanity-defense
standards with other criminal-law defenses like mistake of fact or duress, Profes-
sor Christopher Slobogin notes how "[t]he category of 'criminal insanity' perpetu-
ates the extremely damaging myth that people with mental disability are especially
dangerous or especially lacking in self-control." 2 5 He cites an article I wrote about
21. See infra text accompanying note 75 (noting that incompetency is a status, not a defense, and that raising it
is in no way a concession of factual guilt).
22. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 109 (1994) [hereinafter PERLIN,
INSANITY DEFENSE JURISPRUDENCE] (citing Jeraldine Braff, Thomas Arvanites & Henry J. Steadman, Detention
Patterns of Successful and Unsuccessful Insanity Defendants, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 439, 445 (1983) (stating that
unsuccessful insanity pleaders were institutionalized 22% longer than those who never raised the plea))
(discussing how defendants who unsuccessfully pleaded insanity-thus raising their mental-health status to the
fact finder-served significantly longer sentences than defendants convicted of like charges who did not proffer
an insanity defense); see also DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 644-45 (1990) (stating that research into 128 Georgia capital cases in 1990 revealed that an
unsuccessful insanity defense strongly correlated with a sentence of death). Such an unsuccessful defense may
also thwart a defendant's attempts to seek sentencing reduction under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See
James Gusfa & Maya Prabhu, Sentencing Adjustment Following an Unsuccessful Insanity Defense, 43 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 114 (2015) (discussing United States v. Herriman, 739 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir. 2014)).
23. If a defendant is incompetent to stand trial-as that term has been used for millennia, see PERLIN &
CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 13-1.2 to 13-1.2.2-then he does not have the "sufficient present ability to consult with
his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding [or] a rational as well as factual understanding of
the proceedings against him." See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam); infra text
accompanying note 128.
24. For an extensive discussion on TJ, see infra text accompanying notes 237-47. TJ "asks us to look at law as
it actually impacts people's lives" and "focus[es] on law's impact on emotional life" and psychological
well-being. Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on Dealing with Victims of
Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009); see David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence:
Psycholegal Soft Spots and Strategies, in DENNIS P. STOLLE ET AL., PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW
AS A HELPING PROFESSION 45 (2000). Its ultimate aim is to determine whether legal rules, procedures, and roles for
lawyers can or should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while not subordinating due-process
principles. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "And My Best Friend, My Doctor/Won't Even Say What It Is I've Got":
The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 751 (2005)
[hereinafter Perlin, Role and Significance of Counsel].
25. Christopher Slobogin, Eliminating Mental Disability as a Legal Criterion in Deprivation of Liberty Cases:
The Impact of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on the Insanity Defense, Civil
Commitment, and Competency Law, 40 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 297, 309 (2016) [hereinafter Slobogin, Eliminating
Mental Disability]. I agree with Slobogin that the entire way the insanity defense is perceived and discussed in the
public arena perpetuates these sanist myths. I believe it is not the defense but rather the empirically and
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what I call "sanism":26 "the pervasive stigma that befalls persons with mental
disabilities." 27 I agree that sanism leads many to believe that insanity pleaders are
somehow typical of all persons with mental disabilities. But, as I discuss exten-
sively below, that same sanism will lead to disaster for this population if this status
and defense are abolished.2 8
Support of the abolitionist positions by portions of the disability-rights-
advocacy community exhibits a startling lack of understanding of the treatment of
this population in prison settings. By obsessively focusing on only two articles of
the CRPD, the abolitionist position ignores other articles of that CRPD that
support the continuation of this defense and this status, 2 9 as well as other
international human-rights conventions that speak to the right to a "fair trial."30
Even if, under a tortured reading, one can assume that Article 12 can be read to
support this position, consideration of it in the context of the rest of the Convention
must lead us to reject this argument. The abolitionist position is shortsighted and, if
adopted, would inevitably lead to a worsening of the lives of a segment of the
population of persons with disabilities that has never been consulted in this
conversation. 3 1 For example, Article 4(4) of the CRPD mandates that "[n]othing in
the present Convention shall affect any provisions which are more conducive to the
realization of the rights of persons with disabilities and which may be contained in
the law of a State Party or international law in force for that State." 32 There is no
behaviorally-inaccurate myths that surround the conversation about the defense. See Michael L. Perlin, The
Insanity Defense: Nine Myths that Will Not Go Away, in THE INSANITY DEFENSE: MULTIDISCIPLINARY VIEWS ON ITS
HISTORY, TRENDS, AND CONTROVERSIES 3 (Mark D. White ed., 2017) [hereinafter Perlin, Nine Myths].
26. Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism," 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 374 (1992).
27. Michael L. Perlin, "Striking for the Guardians and Protectors of the Mind": The Convention on the Rights
ofPersons with Mental Disabilities and the Future ofGuardianship Law, 117 PENN ST. L. REv. 1159, 1161 (2013)
[hereinafter Perlin, Guardians and Protectors] (quoting MICHAEL L. PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND
MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD viii (2012) [hereinafter PERLIN, WHEN THE SILENCED
ARE HEARD]).
28. See infra note 92 (discussing, in a parallel context, Justice Scalia's dissent in Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S.
164 (2008) (finding that defendant who is competent to stand trial may not be competent to represent himself)).
29. See infra text accompanying notes 50-53.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 54-55.
31. My argument is strengthened by a consideration of the "incredible dilemma" literature, which seeks to
resolve the knotty dilemma of harmonizing constitutional and statutory rights that appear to be in direct conflict.
On the significance of this dilemma in other areas of mental-disability law, see, for example, Paul S. Appelbaum,
Protecting the Rights ofPersons with Disabilities: An International Convention and Its Problems, 67 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVS. 366, 367 (2016) ("That [abolition] would lead to the conviction and imprisonment of defendants with
severe mental illnesses who would not previously have been held responsible for their actions goes unmen-
tioned."); Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the Last
Frontier?, 20 N.YU. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 517, 540 n.142 (1994) (citing Peter Westen, Incredible Dilemmas:
Conditioning One Constitutional Right on the Forfeiture ofAnother, 66 IOWA L. REv. 741, 742 (1981)); see also
infra note 53.
32. CRPD, supra note 1, art. 4 (emphasis added). My thanks to Penny Weller for reminding me of this
provision. See also John Dawson, A Realistic Approach to Assessing Mental Health Laws' Compliance with the
UNCRPD, 40 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 70, 71 (2015) (arguing that failure to consider a person's disability may,
under some circumstances, be discriminatory).
482 [Vol. 54:477
INSANITY, INCOMPETENCY, AND THE CRPD
mention of Article 4 in any of the literature that suggests that the CRPD requires
the abolition of the insanity defense, the incompetency status, or both.
Finally, this proposal repudiates every tenet of TJ. Abolishing the incompetency
status and the insanity defense deprives this population of authentic due process,
participating in fair trials, and having a voice.3 3 It may or may not be coincidental
that one of the leaders of the CRPD-based movement to abolish these defenses is
also on record as saying that TJ "is a concept to avoid." 3 4 This position must be
rejected.
First, this Article will discuss the significance of the CRPD and why, when it is
read as an integrated document, the interpretations in the GCs and the supporting
literature must be unequivocally rejected.
Next, this Article will consider the singular role of the insanity defense and
incompetency status in legal history. Here, this Article acknowledges that, while
pleading insanity may sometimes be a bad option, it is still one that needs to be
retained, and retention of the plea reinforces the reality that raising the incompe-
tency status is not an admission of factual guilt. 3 6 Thus, trying a person who is
unable to cooperate with her counsel, rationally understand the proceedings
against her, or both, makes it more likely that she will be convicted of crimes of
which she may not be guilty, a base and basic violation of human decency.
This Article will then consider the GCs to Articles 12 and 14 that are at the
center of this controversy, concluding that they make no conceptual sense. If
implemented, they would violate due process, dignity, and fair-trial mandates, and
would inevitably lead to the torture of persons with mental disabilities who are
charged with and convicted of crimes.37 This denouement is even more staggering
when we realize that there is no indication that this outcome was ever in the minds
of the drafters or was ever debated, or that the populations in question were ever
consulted. This latter failure frontally mocks the precept of "[n]othing about us,
without us."38
33. On the impact of recent defense and incompetency developments on the "pathways" of persons with
serious mental disabilities charged with crime in the context of "voice," see infra text accompanying notes
246-47; Michael L. Perlin, "Wisdom Is Thrown into Jail": Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Remediate the
Criminalization of Persons with Mental Illness, 17 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 343, 364 (2013).
34. Minkowitz, Some Thoughts, supra note 16.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 246-68.
36. This contrasts with the insanity defense, which is a concession that the defendant committed the actus reus.
See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363 (1983) ("A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity establishes two
facts: (i) the defendant committed an act that constitutes a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the act because
of mental illness.").
37. On the question of how treatment of persons with mental disabilities in healthcare facilities may
sometimes amount to torture under international human-rights law, see Bernadette McSherry & Piers Gooding,
Torture and Ill-Treatment in Health Care Settings: Lessons from the United Nations, 20 J.L. & MED. 712, 712
(2013).
38. Michael L. Perlin, "A Change Is Gonna Come": The Implications of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities for the Domestic Practice of Constitutional Mental Disability Law, 29 N. ILL.
U. L. REv. 483, 489 (2009) (referring to this as the "clarion cry" of the disability-rights movement).
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Finally, the abolition of the insanity defense and incompetency status violates
every precept of TJ.39 TJ sees three values as essential elements of the legal
process: voice, validation, and voluntariness. 4 0 Elimination of the insanity defense
and incompetency status makes it virtually impossible that these values will be
privileged, and makes it more likely that sanist behavior on the part of jails, prison
administrators, and line staff will fester to an even greater extent than it does now.
The title of this Article comes from Bob Dylan's brilliant song, Highway 61
Revisited.4 1 I use it here because one of the most nettlesome subsets of insanity-
defense cases flows from what are called "deific decree" cases, where an individu-
al's psychotic delusion leads to a belief that he or she is acting under the direct
command of God.4 2 Consider the full verse, and update it to current times:
Oh God said to Abraham, "Kill me a son"
Abe says, "Man, you must be puttin' me on"
God say, "No." Abe say, "What?"
God say, "You can do what you want Abe, but
The next time you see me comin' you better run"
Well Abe says, "Where do you want this killin' done?"
God says, "Out on Highway 61."43
Highway 61 Revisited is one of Dylan's most famous songs, and a standard
interpretation is that it asks the question: "What kind of a person would it take to
make the leap of faith required to murder one's own son at the command of one's
God?"" That question can logically lead to an inquiry into the sanity of one who
follows such a command to kill one's child. But another analysis, in a blog post
by Dr. Ezra Cappell, Associate Professor of English and director of the Inter-
American Jewish Studies Program at the University of Texas at El Paso, sees a far
39. See Perlin, Role and Significance ofCounsel, supra note 24, at 751; see also Michael L. Perlin, "Everybody
Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain": Considering the Sexual Autonomy Rights of Persons Institutionalized
Because ofMental Disability in Forensic Hospitals and in Asia, 83 WASH. L. REV. 481, 510 (2008) [hereinafter
Perlin, Sexual Autonomy]; Michael L. Perlin, "You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks": Sanism in Clinical
Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683, 711 n.164 (2003).
40. See, e.g., Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education and Therapeutic
Jurisprudence as Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 ToURo L. REV. 601, 627 (2008).
41. OLIVER TRAGER, KEYS TO THE RAIN: THE DEFINITIVE BOB DYLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 252 (2004) (characterizing
the song as "overflowing with genius"); MICHAEL GRAY, THE BOB DYLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 324 (2008) (characteriz-
ing the song as "revolutionary and stunning").
42. See, e.g., State v. Cameron, 674 P.2d 650, 654 (Wash. 1983) (en banc). At least one commentator has used
the biblical story that inspired Dylan's song as a backdrop for an analysis of deific-decree cases in general. See
Andrew J. Demko, Abraham's Deific Defense: Problems with Insanity, Faith, and Knowing Right from Wrong, 80
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1961, 1961 (2005). For a recent, thoughtful article that calls for the end of the deific decree
and the simultaneous expansion of the insanity defense, see Rabia Belt, When God Demands Blood: Unusual
Minds and the Troubled Juridical Ties of Religion, Madness, and Culpability, 69 U. MIAMI L. REv. 755 (2015).
43. See Bob Dylan, Highway 61 Revisited, BOB DYLAN, http://www.bobdylan.com/us/songs/highway-61-
revisited (last visited Nov. 29, 2016).
44. CLINTON HEYLIN, REVOLUTION IN THE AIR: THE SONGS OF BOB DYLAN 1957-1973 258 (2009).
45. See Demko, supra note 42, at 1961.
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darker meaning.46 To Professor Cappell, the song reflects "the indifference of
authority figures to outright cruelty, sadism, and destruction by those in power." 4 7 1
fear that the alleged reform of insanity-defense abolition will precisely lead to
more "cruelty, sadism and destruction."
I. THE CRPD
Several years ago, in an article concluding that the CRPD required a total
overhaul of the guardianship laws of all nations, I argued that this Convention
"radically changes the scope of international human rights law as it applies to all
persons with disabilities, and in no area is this more significant than in the area of
mental disability law." 48 In that article, I described my vision of the CRPD:
The Convention. . . "is regarded as having finally empowered the 'world's
largest minority' to claim their rights, and to participate in international and
national affairs on an equal basis with others who have achieved specific treaty
recognition and protection." [It] is the most revolutionary international human
rights document ever created that applies to persons with disabilities. [It]
furthers the human rights approach to disability and recognizes the right of
people with disabilities to equality in almost every aspect of life. It firmly
endorses a social model of disability-a clear and direct repudiation of the medical
model that traditionally was part-and-parcel of mental disability law. "The Conven-
tion responds to traditional models, situates disability within a social model
framework, and sketches the full range of human rights that apply to all human
beings, all with a particular application to the lives of persons with disabili-
ties." It provides a framework for ensuring that mental health laws "fully
recognize the rights of those with mental illness." There is no question that it
has "ushered in a new era of disability rights policy."49
46. See Ezra Cappell, Highway 61 Revisited Again, INST. FOR JEWISH IDEAS & IDEALS, https://www.jewishideas.
org/article/highway-61-revisited-again.
47. Id. For context on Genesis 22, the portion of the Bible that inspired this verse of Dylan's song, see Sarah
Imhoff, Violence and Secrecy: On Masculinity and the Akedah, 42 SH'MA J. 17 (2011):
Biblical scholars explain that the story of the Akedah [Akedah is Hebrew for binding] marks a
turning point from ancient Near Eastern cultural traditions that include human sacrifice to a
strikingly illustrative polemic against human sacrifice. Do not sacrifice your son, God tells
Abraham. But ironically, the very acts that mark this watershed cultural transition away from
violence are violent in themselves.
It should also be noted that the Israelites at that time were familiar with mental illness. See 1 Samuel 21:11-16. My
thanks to my friend Doug Mossman, and to Gershom Barnard, Rabbi Emeritus of Northern Hills Synagogue,
Cincinnati, Ohio, for pointing this out to me.
48. Perlin, Guardians and Protectors, supra note 27, at 1163.
49. Id. at 1173-74 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Rosemary Kayess & Phillip French, Out of Darkness into
Light? Introducing the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 8 HUM. RTs. L. REv. 1, 4 n.17
(2008); Janet E. Lord & Michael A. Stein, Social Rights and the Relational Value of the Rights to Participate in
Sport, Recreation, and Play, 27 B.U. INT'L L.J. 249, 256 (2009); Bernadette McSherry, International Trends in
Mental Health Laws: Introduction, 26 L. IN CONTEXT 1, 8 (2008); Paul Harpur, Time to Be Heard: How Advocates
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Importantly, the CRPD calls for "[r]espect for inherent dignity";so "[f]reedom
from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment";5 1 "[f]ree-
dom from exploitation, violence and abuse" ;52 and protection of the "integrity of
the person."5 3 These proscriptions and prescriptions build on prior documents-
the rights to a fair trial set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights 54 and in reports and documents by the interregional human-rights courts.5 5
Scholars have made persuasive arguments that these rights apply to trials of
alleged international war criminals;5 6 it is unthinkable to make a persuasive
argument that they do not apply to persons with mental disabilities.5 7
Can Use the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to Drive Change, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 1271,
1295 (2011)).
50. CRPD, supra note 1, art. 3(a).
51. Id. art. 15.
52. Id. art. 16.
53. Id. art. 17. See generally Penelope Weller, And Then What?, Presentation at the Biennial Congress of the
International Academy of Law and Mental Health (July 2015) (slide show on file with author).
54. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 176 art. 14 [hereinafter ICCPR];
see Andrew B. Friedman, Transitional Justice and Local Ownership: A Framework for the Protection of Human
Rights, 46 AKRON L. REV. 727, 742 (2013) ("The right to a fair trial is expressly guaranteed in nearly every general
international human rights document including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ('UDHR'), the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ('ICCPR'), and others.").
55. See, e.g., INTER-AM. COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ORG. OF AM. STATES, REPORT ON TERRORISM AND HUMAN
RIGHTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ¶ 18 (2002), http://www.cidh.org/terrorismleng/exe.htm; American Convention on
Human Rights, 9 I.L.M. 673, 678 art. 8.
56. See U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Indep. Expert on the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, 11 13-35, 44-55, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/103, at 8-13,
16-19 (Feb. 7, 2005); e.g., David Aronofsky, International War Crimes & Other Criminal Courts: Ten
Recommendations for Where We Go from Here and How to Get There-Looking to a Permanent International
Criminal Tribunal, 34 DENV. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 17, 23 (2006) ("[Alny international or national court created to
try war criminals and other international human rights violators must 'establish itself as the preeminent defender
of ... the right of every accused to a fair trial according to the most exacting standards of due process required by
contemporary international law."' (alteration in original) (quoting Monroe Leigh, The Yugoslav Tribunal: Use of
Unnamed Witnesses AgainstAccused, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 235, 237 (1996))).
57. Although the United States has not yet ratified the CRPD, then-President Obama signed the Convention
over five years ago. See Michelle Diament, Obama Urges Senate to Ratify Disability Treaty, DISABLITY SCOOP
(May 18, 2012), https://www.disabilityscoop.com/2012/05/1 8/obama-urges-senate-treaty/15654/. Under such
circumstances, "a state's obligations under it are controlled by the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties .. . which requires signatories 'to refrain from acts which would defeat [the Disability Convention's]
object and purpose."' In re Mark C.H., 906 N.Y.S.2d 419, 433 (Surr. Ct. 2010) (second alteration in original)
(citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331); see Henry Dlugacz
& Christopher Wimmer, The Ethics of Representing Clients with Limited Competency in Guardianship
Proceedings, 4 ST. Louis U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 331, 362-63 (2011); e.g., In re Guardianship of Dameris L.,
956 N.Y.S.2d 848, 854 (Surr. Ct. 2012) (holding that substantive-due-process requirement to adhere to principal
of least restrictive alternative applies to guardianships sought for mentally disabled persons); Mark C.H., 906
N.Y.S.2d at 435 (holding that due process requires that the guardianship appointment be subject to a requirement
of periodic reporting and review). Domestic courts in New York have thus cited the CRPD approvingly in cases
involving guardianship matters. In one such case, Surrogate Judge Kristin Booth Glen noted that the CRPD was
"entitled to 'persuasive weight' in interpreting our own laws and constitutional protections." Dameris L., 956
N.Y.S.2d at 855. See generally Michael L. Perlin & Meredith R. Schriver, "You Might Have Drugs at Your
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As I will discuss more extensively below, it demeans any notion of dignity-one
of the foundational rights of the CRPD-to deprive persons with mental disabili-
ties the right to plead insanity, or to force them to trial if they are not competent to
consult with counsel or understand the proceedings against them.5 " It also flies in
the face of nearly seventy years of international human-rights law. 5 9
II. THE INCOMPETENCY STATUS AND THE INSANITY DEFENSE
A. Incompetency Status
Few principles are as firmly embedded in criminal jurisprudence as the doctrine
that an "incompetent" defendant may not be put to trial.6 0 The doctrine traces back
to mid-seventeenth-century England, 1 with commentators generally focusing on:
(1) the incompetent defendant's inability to aid in his defense,62 (2) the parallels to
the historic ban on trials in absentia,6 3 and (3) the parallels to the problems raised
by defendants who refused to plead to the charges entered against them.64
The primary purpose of the incompetency status was to "safeguard the accuracy
of adjudication." 6 5 As early as 1899, a U.S. federal court of appeals held that it was
"not 'due process of law' to subject an insane person to trial upon an indictment
involving liberty or life."6 6 Contemporaneously, the Tennessee Supreme Court
Command": Reconsidering the Forced Drugging of Incompetent Pre-Trial Detainees from the Perspectives of
International Human Rights and Income Inequality, 8 ALB. Gov'T L. REv. 381, 387 (2015).
58. See infra text accompanying note 134.
59. For an overview of international human-rights law in the context of persons with mental disabilities, and
the need to ensure dignity in all interactions with the legal system, see generally PERLIN, WHEN THE SILENCED ARE
HEARD, supra note 27.
60. See generally PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 13-2.
61. See Bruce J. Winick & Terry L. DeMeo, Competence to Stand Trial in Florida, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 31,
32 n.2 (1980). See generally GRP. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, MISUSE OF PSYCHIATRY IN THE CRIMINAL
COURTS: COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 912-15 (1974); HENRY WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL
DEFENSE 428-30 (1954). Roesch and Golding have suggested that the same problems may have been present as
early as the thirteenth century. RONALD ROESCH & STEPHEN L. GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 10 (1980).
62. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *386-401; 1 MATTHEw HALE ET AL., THE HISTORY OF
THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 434 (1847). See generally Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants
with Mental Retardation to Participate in Their Own Defense, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 419 (1990); Thomas
Grisso, Five-Year Research Update (1986-1990): Evaluationsfor Competence to Stand Trial, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L.
353 (1992).
63. See, e.g., Caleb Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REV.
832, 834 (1960). This issue is discussed in People v. Berling, 251 P.2d 1017, 1024 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953).
64. Until the late eighteenth century, if the court concluded that a defendant was remaining "mute of malice," it
could order him to be subjected to the practice of peine forte et dure, the placing of increasingly heavy weights on
the defendant's chest to "press" him for an answer. See, e.g., Ralph Slovenko, The Developing Law on
Competency to Stand Trial, 5 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 165, 168-69 (1977). This practice was abolished in England in
1772. Id. at 168.
65. Claudine Walker Ausness, Note, The Identification of Incompetent Defendants: Separating Those Unfit for
Adversary Combat from Those Who Are Fit, 66 Ky. L.J. 666, 668 (1978).
66. Youtsey v. United States, 97 E 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1899). The constant blurring of the terms "insanity" and
"incompetency" has been vexing. See, e.g., Bruce v. Estelle, 483 F.2d 1031, 1041-43 (5th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Taylor, 437 F.2d 371, 375-76 (4th Cir. 1971); Harrison v. Settle, 151 F. Supp. 372, 375 (W.D. Mo. 1957);
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
suggested: "It would be inhumane, and to a certain extent a denial of the right of
trial upon the merits, to require one who has been disabled by the act of God from
intelligently making his defense to plead or be tried for his life or liberty." 6 7 It
became black-letter law that the "trial and conviction of a person mentally and
physically incapable of making a defense violates certain immutable principles of
justice which inhere in the very idea of free government."6 " First, an incompetent
defendant might alone have exculpatory information that he is incapable of
transmitting to counsel.69 Second, to try an incompetent defendant has been
likened to permitting an adversary contest "in which the defendant, like a small
boy being beaten by a bully, is unable to dodge or return the blows."7 0 Third, it has
been suggested that the trial of an incompetent defendant transforms the adversary
process from "a reasoned interaction between an individual and his community"
into "an invective against an insensible object."7 1 Fourth, "it seems essential to the
philosophy of punishment that the defendant know why he is being punished, and
such comprehension is to a great extent dependent upon involvement with the trial
itself." 7 2 Actions against incompetent defendants were decried over three centuries
ago by Lord Coke as "a miserable spectacle, both against law, and of extreme
inhumanity and cruelty, and can be no example to others."7 3
The rationale of the incompetency status is clear. It is fundamentally unfair to try
a defendant who may not have-in the language of the U.S. Supreme Court, in
Dusky v. United States-"sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with
a reasonable degree of rational understanding [or] a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him." 7 4
State v. Bowman, 681 A.2d 469, 470-71 (Me. 1996); ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 61, at 15-17; Winick &
DeMeo, supra note 61, at 36. It is clear that the court in Youtsey was referring to an incompetent, not an insane,
defendant.
67. Jordan v. State, 135 S.W. 327, 328 (Tenn. 1911); see also Ausness, supra note 65, at 670 ("A seldom
mentioned but powerful psychological reason for the requirement that the defendant be competent is that in order
to satisfy the urge of the community to punish, the defendant must understand what he is being punished for.").
68. Sanders v. Allen, 100 E2d 717, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932)).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284, 287 (S.D. Ala. 1906).
70. Ausness, supra note 65, at 669. I acknowledge that much of this eighteenth-century language is hopelessly
sanist and laden with stereotypes.
71. Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARV. L. REv. 454, 458 (1967).
72. Id. (footnote omitted).
73. 3 COKE, INSTITUTES 6 (1797). See generally Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398 (1897).
74. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam). Not all jurisdictions, of course, define
fitness in the same way. In Australia, by way of example, unfitness is defined in the Crimes (Mental Impairment
and Unfitness to Be Tried) Act 1997, in this manner:
When is a person unfit to stand trial?
(1) A person is unfit to stand trial for an offence if, because the person's mental processes are
disordered or impaired, the person is or, at some time during the trial, will be-
(a) unable to understand the nature of the charge; or
(b) unable to enter a plea to the charge and to exercise the right to challenge jurors or the
jury; or
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It also needs to be stressed that incompetency is a status, not a defense, and
raising it is in no way a concession of factual guilt like invocation of the insanity
defense. The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice under-
score that the doctrine of incompetence to stand trial "has no bearing on guilt or
innocence."7  However, "[a]lthough there is nothing in the invocation of the
incompetency status that at all concedes factual guilt . . . it is assumed by all that
the defendant did, in fact, commit the crime."
Competency determinations are not easy ones to make. The Supreme Court
acknowledged this in Drope v. Missouri:
[E]vidence of a defendant's irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any
prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all relevant in determin-
ing whether further inquiry is required, but . . . even one of these factors
standing alone may, in some circumstances, be sufficient. There are, of course,
no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further
inquiry to determine fitness to proceed; the question is often a difficult one in
which a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated.
But there is no question that the trial of a person who has been found to be
incompetent violates every basic tenet of due process. 7 9 Any reform that makes it
more likely that there will be an increase in such trials must be rejected out of hand.
(c) unable to understand the nature of the trial (namely that it is an inquiry as to whether
the person committed the offence); or
(d) unable to follow the course of the trial; or
(e) unable to understand the substantial effect of any evidence that may be given in
support of the prosecution; or
(f) unable to give instructions to his or her legal practitioner.
(2) A person is not unfit to stand trial only because he or she is suffering from memory loss.
Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic) pt 2 (Austl.). Note that all subsections of
this law are enumerated disjunctively, not conjunctively.
75. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON MENTAL HEALTH ch. 7, pt. IV (AM. BAR Ass'N 2015).
76. Id.
77. Perlin, Upside Down, supra note 20, at 246. It should be noted that in some other jurisdictions (e.g.,
Queensland, Australia), raising unfitness means that there is no examination of the alleged facts and that the
defendant will automatically be detained or supervised as though she had committed the underlying crime. See,
e.g., Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) ch 7 pt 7 div 1 s 288(1) (Austl.). The Mental Health Court, to which criminal
cases are transferred if mental health is an issue, may or must make a forensic order for the person's detention for
involuntary treatment if the person:
(a) was of unsound mind when the alleged offence was committed; or
(b) is unfit for trial for the alleged offence and the unfitness for trial is of a permanent nature; or
(c) is unfit for trial for the alleged offence and the unfitness for trial is not of a permanent nature.
Id. (emphasis added). A forensic order is mandatory for those in category (c). Id. s 288(3).
78. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975).
79. See Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.
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In this context, it is helpful to consider the Supreme Court's decision in Indiana
v. Edwards.so There, the Court grappled with the question of when a trial court
could override a mentally-ill-but-competent-to-stand-trial criminal defendant's
wishes to represent himself pro se. The Court held that the Constitution permits
states to insist upon representation by counsel for those who are competent enough
to stand trial but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point that they
are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves. 1 In coming to this
conclusion, the Court carefully distinguished its earlier decision in Godinez v.
Moran 82 -which held that the standard for competency to stand trial, waive
counsel, and plead guilty were identical-noting that Godinez did not deal with
this specific question.8 3
In explaining the rationale of its decision, the Court employed concepts inherent
to procedural justice:8 4
Mental illness itself is not a unitary concept. It varies in degree. It can vary
over time. It interferes with an individual's functioning at different times in
different ways. The history of this case . . . illustrates the complexity of the
problem. In certain instances an individual may well be able to satisfy Dusky's
mental competence standard, for he will be able to work with counsel at trial,
yet at the same time he may be unable to carry out the basic tasks needed to
present his own defense without the help of counsel.8 5
The Court here looked at dignitarian concerns, 6 relying on McKaskle v. Wiggins
for the proposition that "dignity and autonomy" of the individual "underlie [the]
self-representation right."8 8 The Court underscored that in the case of a defendant
with an "uncertain mental state, the spectacle that could well result from his
self-representation at trial is at least as likely to prove humiliating as ennobling."8 9
The Court found that proceedings must not only be fair; they must "appear fair to
all who observe them." 90
80. 554 U.S. 164 (2008). On Supreme Court decision-making and dignitarian concepts in cases involving
criminal punishments, see Jonathan Simon & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Dignifying Madness: Rethinking Commit-
ment Law in an Age ofMass Incarceration, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 29-32 (2015).
81. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 174.
82. 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993).
83. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 173.
84. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY: RETHINKING CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND MENTAL
DISABLITY LAw 83-88 (2013) [hereinafter PERLIN, PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY].
85. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 175-76.
86. See generally David C. Yamada, Dignity, "Rankism," and Hierarchy in the Workplace: Creating a
"Dignitarian" Agendafor American Employment Law, 28 BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAB. L. 305 (2007).
87. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 187-88 (1984) (finding appointment of standby counsel over
self-represented defendant's objection is permissible).
88. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 176 (citing McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 176-77).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 177 (emphasis added) (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988)). Here, the Court
quoted from an amicus brief reporting on a psychiatrist's reaction to observing a defendant-who, although
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This focus on dignity and the perception of justice, in addition to being the
Court's "first implicit endorsement of important principles of therapeutic jurispru-
dence91 in a criminal procedure context,"92 is central to this Article's thesis: how
can our legal system allow a person who did not have the "sufficient present ability
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding [or] a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him" 93 to go to
trial?
B. Insanity Defense
I have been writing about the insanity defense for forty-five years, both in
international 94 and domestic 95 contexts. 96 I concede that U.S. insanity-defense
jurisprudence is often incoherent,97 but this sad reality in no way minimizes, in my
mind, the critical role it plays in any criminal-justice system that is fundamentally
fair. As I will discuss below, discarding it would disregard millennia of experience
and violate the most basic concepts of due process.
Few areas of our legal system have engendered as intense debate as the role of
the insanity defense in the criminal-justice process. 98 On the one hand, this
"difficult subject" is seen as a reflection of "the fundamental moral principles of
our criminal law." 99 It rests on "assumptions that are older than the Republic"1 00
satisfying the Dusky standard, was still mentally ill -attempt to conduct his own trial: "[H]ow in the world can
our legal system allow an insane man to defend himself?" Id. (alteration in original).
91. See infra text accompanying notes 237-47.
92. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 13-2.4. This endorsement can be juxtaposed with Justice Scalia's
dissent, suggesting that the majority view is sanist (as the decision "permits [defendants with mental disabilities]
to be deprived of a basic constitutional right-for their own good," Edwards, 554 U.S. at 189 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting), and thus opening up a question that has not been paid that much attention in the post-Godinez years: Is
it more sanist to deprive persons with mental disabilities of a right that all other citizens have (i.e., that of
self-representation) or to allow such persons to represent themselves in trials that may be nothing more than
charades? See Michael L. Perlin, "Dignity Was the First to Leave": Godinez v. Moran, Colin Ferguson, and the
Trial of Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendants, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 61, 78-80 (1996) [hereinafter Perlin,
Dignity] (discussing the trial of Colin Ferguson).
93. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam).
94. See Michael L. Perlin, The Insanity Defense in English-Speaking African Countries, 2 AFR. L. STUD. 73
(1969).
95. E.g., Michael L. Perlin, "The Borderline Which Separated You from Me": The Insanity Defense, the
Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IowA L. REV. 1375, 1377-78 (1997)
[hereinafter Perlin, Borderline]; Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity
Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 599 (1989) [hereinafter Perlin, Unpacking].
96. See generally PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 14-1.1.
97. PERLIN, INSANITY DEFENSE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22, at 1.
98. See generally Perlin, Unpacking, supra note 95, at 601, 609-11; PERLIN, INSANITY DEFENSE JURISPRU-
DENCE, supra note 22, at 3. See also Michael L. Perlin, "Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline": Mental
Disability Law, Theory and Practice, "Us" and "Them," 31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 775, 776-77 (1998) [hereinafter
Perlin, Us and Them].
99. United States v. Lyons, 739 F.2d 994, 994 (5th Cir. 1984) (Rubin, J., dissenting). The majority opinion in
Lyons is found at 731 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1984).
100. See Lyons, 739 F.2d at 995 (Rubin, J., dissenting) (citing HALE ET AL., supra note 62).
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and on "beliefs about human rationality, deterrability, and free will";o and it
serves as a bulwark of the law's "moorings of condemnation for moral failure." 10 2
As stated by an Ohio court, "the insanity defense goes to the very root of our
criminal justice system." 1 0 3 On the other hand, the insanity defense is attacked on
the basis of a series of myths that have been firmly and conclusively disproved by
all the valid and reliable statistical and empirical evidence. 10 4
Notwithstanding the insanity defense's relative numerical insignificance,1 0 5 it is
rooted in moral principles of excuse that are accepted "in both ordinary human
interaction and criminal law," 1o6 and it continues to serve as a "surrogate for
resolution of the most profound issues in criminal justice."1 0 7 As Professor Susan
Bandes has suggested, "[t]he evolution of the insanity defense represents a
continuing struggle to incorporate expanding medical knowledge into our system
of laws."os
Historically, the defense has been "a major component of the Anglo-American
common law for over 700 years." 1 09 Rooted in Talmudic, Greek, and Roman
history, its forerunners can actually be traced back over 3000 years.110 The
sixth-century Code of Justinian explicitly recognized that the "insane" were not
responsible for their acts."' By the ninth century, the "Dooms of Alfred" 1 2
acknowledged that an impaired individual who could not "acknowledge or confess
his offences" was absolved from personally making restitution. 11 3 The defense's
101. Richard J. Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal
Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427, 448 (1980).
102. John Monahan, Abolish the Insanity Defense?-Not Yet, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 719, 731 (1973) (quoting
Joseph M. Livermore & Paul E. Meehl, The Virtues ofM'Naghten, 51 MINN. L. REV. 789, 797 (1967)).
103. State v. Curry, 543 N.E.2d 1228, 1230 (Ohio 1989).
104. See generally Perlin, Nine Myths, supra note 25. See also infra text accompanying note 152.
105. See Perlin, Nine Myths, supra note 25, at 8-10. By way of example, in New Jersey, the NGRI plea was
successful in 0.05% of all cases handled by the state public defender's office in one year. See Joseph H.
Rodriguez, Laura M. LeWinn & Michael L. Perlin, The Insanity Defense Under Siege: Legislative Assaults and
Legal Rejoinders, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 397, 401-02 (1983). There were 141 successful insanity defenses over an
eight-year period. Id.
106. Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 782
(1985).
107. LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR. 127 (1984).
108. Susan Bandes, Developments in the Insanity Defense, 10 BARRISTER 41, 45 (1983).
109. See Robert L. Sadoff & Frank M. Dattilio, Criminal Responsibility, in HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC
ASSESSMENT: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC PERSPECTIVES 121 (Eric Y. Drogin et al. eds., 2011); 2 H.
BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 424 (Longman & Thorne trans., 1968). Professor Jonas
Robitscher and a colleague date the "firm[] entrench[ment]" of the insanity defense to the ninth century. Jonas
Robitscher & Andrew Ky Haynes, In Defense of the Insanity Defense, 31 EMORY L.J. 9, 10 (1982).
110. For an overview dating to the Code of Hammurabi, from a clinician's perspective, see Daniel P.
Greenfield, Criminal Responsibility from a Clinical Perspective, 37 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 7 (2009).
111. 2 S.P. SCOTT, THE CIVILLAw 259 (1973).
112. Dooms were laws promulgated by Anglo-Saxon and Danish kings; among the most famous and best
preserved are those issued by King Alfred, between 890 and 900 A.D. See Daniel R. Coquillette, The Lessons of
Anglo-Saxon "Justice," 2 GREEN BAG 251, 253 (1999).
113. 2 NIGEL WALKER, CRIME AND INSANITY IN ENGLAND 219 (1968).
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modern roots can be traced at least as far back as a 1505 case-the first recorded
jury verdict of insanity' 1 4-but it is clear that even prior to that case, juries
considered "acquittal to be the appropriate result" in certain insanity-defense
cases.1 15 Further, William Lambard's late-sixteenth-century text on criminal respon-
sibility' 1 6  suggested that the insanity defense was already "well settled" in
England,' 1 7 and Sir Coke's 1817 treatise "gave the law the familiar maxim that 'a
madman is only punished by his madness."'1 1 8 In short, the defense has been a part
of the fabric of the law since "time immemorial."
C. The Indispensability of the Incompetency Status and Insanity Defense
As this brief historical overview should make clear, both the incompetency
status and the insanity defense are indispensable segments of a mature and
coherent legal system. It is true that a handful of U.S. states have abolished the
insanity defense,1 1 9 but clearly there must be at least a mens rea exception.120
Importantly, commentators have been uniformly critical of the abolitionist
states. One critic of Kansas's law said:
Kansas's mens rea approach is not a satisfactory alternative to the former
insanity defense. Even though the approach is relatively simple and straightfor-
ward when compared to M'Naghten, it is too narrow in its application. It
unfairly punishes people who are completely unable to understand the nature
114. See id. at 25-26.
115. See Sadoff & Dattilio, supra note 109, at 121.
116. William Lambarde was a sixteenth-century scholar whose definition of insanity was quoted by the Third
Circuit in 1961:
If a mad man or a naturall foole, or a lunatike in the time of his lunacie, or a childe y apparently
hath no knowledge of good nor euil do kill a ma, this is no felonious acte, nor any thing forfeited by
it ... for they cannot be said to haue any understanding wil. But if upo examinatio it fal out, y they
knew what they did, & y it was ill, the seemth it to be otherwise.
United States v. Currens, 290 FI2d 751, 764 (3d Cir. 1961). The quoted volume was apparently written as a
handbook for justices of the peace. See Robitscher & Haynes, supra note 109, at 12.
117. William Lambarde, Eirenarcha, or of the Office of the Justices of the Peace (1581), reprinted in JOHN
BIGGS, JR., THE GuILTY MIND: PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW OF HoMICIDE 47-56, 81-88 (1955).
118. Robitscher & Haynes, supra note 109, at 12 n.10 (quoting COKE, supra note 73, at 247a-b ("furiosus solo
furore punitur")).
119. See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 14-1.5.
120. See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006) (finding Arizona's use of insanity test stated solely in terms of
capacity to tell whether act charged as crime was right or wrong did not violate U.S. Constitution). Clark has
"spawned some of the most caustic commentary in decades responding to a Court decision in this area of law and
policy." PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 14-1.2.8. Consider the titles of some of the articles flaying the Clark
Court for the narrowness of its decision. See, e.g., Henry F Fradella, How Clark v. Arizona Imprisoned Another
Schizophrenic While Signaling the Demise of Clinical Forensic Psychology in Criminal Courts, 10 N.Y.C. L.
REv. 127 (2006); Elizabeth Aileen Smith, Did They Forget to Zero the Scales?: To Ease Jury Deliberations, the
Supreme Court Cuts Protection for the Mentally Ill in Clark v. Arizona, 26 L. & INEQ. 203 (2008); Susan D.
Rozelle, Fear and Loathing in Insanity Law: Explaining the Otherwise Inexplicable Clark v. Arizona, 58 CASEW.
RES. L. REv. 19 (2007).
2017] 493
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
and consequences of their actions. Our criminal justice system has been
premised on the belief that only people who are responsible for their actions
should be punished.121
The General Comment rejects this bedrock premise of the criminal justice,
allegedly in support of universal capacity. Nothing could be more misguided.
III. THE GENERAL COMMENT
Nearly two decades ago, I wrote this in an article about the "borderlines" around
the insanity defense that needed to be considered:
I believe that the insanity defense has always been a symbol and a screen. 12 2
It has always served as a litmus test for how we feel about a host of social,
political, cultural and behavioral issues that far transcend the narrow questions
of whether a specific defendant should be held responsible for what-on its
surface-is a criminal act, or how responsibility should be legally calibrated,
or of the sort of institution in which a successful insanity acquittee should be
housed.
At its base, how we feel about the insanity defense illuminates how we feel
about the relationships between mental health and the law, between mental
health professionals and judges, between criminals and victims, between the
media and the trial process, between the law-abiding and the law-flaunting. In
short, our feelings about the insanity defense reflect our feelings about
borderlines .... 123
Let us start with the question of incompetency. The Comment on Article 14 begins:
"Liberty and security of the person is one of the most precious rights to which
everyone is entitled. In particular, all persons with disabilities, and especially
persons with mental disabilities or psychosocial disabilities are entitled to liberty
pursuant to article 14 of the Convention."1 2 4 This is certainly one of the founda-
tional CRPD rights. But the Comment moves from there to the call to abolish the
incompetency status. In a section headed "Detention of persons unfit to plead in
criminal justice systems," the Comment states: "The committee has established
that declarations of unfitness to stand trial and the detention of persons based on
that declaration is contrary to article 14 of the convention since it deprives the
121. Marc Rosen, Insanity Denied: Abolition ofthe Insanity Defense in Kansas, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 253,
262 (1999). See generally R. Michael Shoptaw, M'Naghten Is a Fundamental Right: Why Abolishing the
Traditional Insanity Defense Violates Due Process, 84 Miss. L.J. 1101 (2015).
122. I use the word "screen" self-consciously, drawing on Judge Adams's dissent in Virgin Islands v.
Fredericks, 578 F.2d 927, 937 (3d Cir. 1978) (finding that criminal law operates "as a screen upon which the
community . . . project[s] its visions of criminal justice"). I do not believe that the community's vision of criminal
justice is one that consigns persons with serious mental illness to prisons in which they are the most likely to be
tortured and brutalized. See infra text accompanying notes 205-08.
123. Perlin, Borderline, supra note 95, at 1377-78.
124. CRPD, Statement on Article 14, supra note 13. Of course, I have no quarrel whatsoever with this
statement.
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person of his or her right to due process and safeguards that are applicable to every
defendant." 1 2 5
This astonishing leap makes no sense whatsoever. Consider what Article 14
actually says:
1. States Parties shall ensure that persons with disabilities, on an equal basis
with others:
(a) Enjoy the right to liberty and security of person;
(b) Are not deprived of their liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily, and that any
deprivation of liberty is in conformity with the law, and that the existence of
a disability shall in no case justify a deprivation of liberty.
2. States Parties shall ensure that if persons with disabilities are deprived of
their liberty through any process, they are, on an equal basis with others,
entitled to guarantees in accordance with international human rights law and
shall be treated in compliance with the objectives and principles of the present
Convention, including by provision of reasonable accommodation. 12 6
Nothing in this article offers the slightest shred of support to the abolition of the
incompetency status. First, as indicated earlier, international human rights have,
for decades, included the right to a fair trial. 127 The trial of a person who cannot
comprehend what is going on or who cannot cooperate with her counsel cannot be
a fair trial. 128 Articulation of the incompetency status in no way indicates factual
guilt. 129 But if a defendant cannot articulate to her lawyer what her defense is, what
other witnesses might be able to shed light on the underlying facts, or what her
relationship with the alleged victim was, then it is incomprehensible to think that,
in all but the rarest cases, such a trial will lead to an acquittal. 13 0
Second, the Comment does not address the critical question of what happens if
such a person chooses to waive counsel and represent herself. This is an issue that
the Supreme Court has grappled with twice in recent years. 13 1 Its more recent
decision, in Indiana v. Edwards, held that states could insist upon the representa-
tion by counsel for those who are competent enough to stand trial but who still
125. Id.
126. CRPD, supra note 1, art. 14.
127. See ICCPR, supra note 54, art. 14; see also, e.g., Charles Chernor Jalloh, Does Living by the Sword Mean
Dying by the Sword?, 117 PENN ST. L. REv. 707, 740 (2013).
128. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam).
129. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 75.
130. As noted, supra text accompanying note 70, over 200 years ago, a court noted that to allow an
incompetent defendant to be tried is like permitting an adversary contest "in which the defendant, like a small boy
being beaten by a bully, is unable to dodge or return the blows." Ausness, supra note 65, at 669.
131. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (establishing unitary test for competency to stand trial, plead
guilty, and waive counsel), modified in Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008) (holding right to self-
representation not absolute, and State could insist attorney be appointed to represent mentally ill defendant though
defendant found competent to stand trial). I discuss both cases in this context in Michael L. Perlin & Alison J.
Lynch, "All His Sexless Patients": Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Competence to Have Sex, 89 WASH.
L. REV. 257, 263 n.21 (2014) [hereinafter Perlin & Lynch, Sexless Patients].
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suffer from severe mental illness to the point that they are not competent to
conduct trial proceedings by themselves. 13 2 Such self-representation at trial will
not "affirm the dignity" of a defendant who lacks the mental capacity to conduct
his defense without the assistance of counsel. 13 3 The trial of an incompetent
defendant mocks any definition of dignity, 13 4 one of the basic tenets of the
CRPD. 1 3 5
Third, even assuming there is any textual support within Article 14 for this
tortured reading, it is black-letter law that any piece of legislation must be read in
pari materia.136 It is axiomatic that a statute "must, to the extent possible, ensure
that the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent."l37 Consider again other
articles of the CRPD: mandating "[r]espect for inherent dignity"; 1 38 "[f]reedom
from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"; 1 39 "[firee-
dom from exploitation, violence and abuse"; 14 0 a right to protection of the
"integrity of the person"; 14 1 and the retention of any provisions "more conducive
to the ... rights of persons with disabilities."1 4 2 Any interpretation of Article 14
that makes it more likely that factually innocent individuals will be convicted and
incarcerated and that makes it less likely that the individual's trial will be "fair"
must be rejected.
Turn now to the insanity defense. On the one hand, some states have abolished
the defense, 14 3 and the defense is not available in some other nations. 14 4 On the
other hand, it should be noted that the defense is available in the International
132. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178.
133. Id. at 176 (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-77 (1984)).
134. See generally Perlin, Dignity, supra note 92.
135. CRPD, supra note 1, art. 3(a).
136. Statutes must be "taken, read, and construed together, each enactment in reference to the other, as though
they were parts of one and the same law." See Peraza v. State, 467 S.W.3d 508, 520 n.29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)
(quoting Jones v. State, 396 S.W.3d 558, 561-62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)).
137. Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 222 (2008); see also Kevin Hembree, Note, Of Two Minds
About Plain Meaning: The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Word "Any" in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c), 60 MERCER
L. REv. 1487, 1499 n.121 (2008) ("[A] statute should be both internally consistent and consistent with other
similar statutes." (citing LINDA D. JELLUM & DAVID HRICIK, MODERN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: PROBLEMS,
THEORIES, AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES 172-73 (2006))).
138. CRPD, supra note 1, art. 3(a).
139. Id. art. 15.
140. Id. art. 16.
141. Id. art. 17.
142. Id. art. 4(4).
143. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
144. See John Q. La Fond, Observations on the Insanity Defense and Involuntary Civil Commitment in Europe,
7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 527 (1984) (defense abolished in Sweden). Though, internationally, insanity is
generally "widely recognized" as a defense to crime. See William A. Schabas, International Norms on Execution
of the Insane and the Mentally Retarded, 4 CRIM. L.F. 95, 95 (1993). On the infrequency of its use in Norway, see
Colin Jacobsen & Daniel Maier-Katkin, Breivik's Sanity: Terrorism, Mass Murder and the Insanity Defense, 37
HUM. RTs. Q. 137 (2015); Michael S. Moore, The Quest for a Responsible Responsibility Test: Norwegian
Insanity Law after Breivik, 9 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 645 (2015).
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Criminal Court. 145 As I have often noted in other contexts, I believe that abolition
is wrongheaded, counterproductive, and likely a violation of due process. 14 6
Twenty years ago, I charged that "[t]he intellectual vacuity among politically-
motivated abolitionists is illuminated by the striking lack of interest that has been
shown in the empirical data in those jurisdictions where abolition has been
attempted." 1 4 7 I have also argued that the abolition movement has been fueled by
the "common wisdom"1 48 that the insanity defense is an abused, over-pleaded, and
over-accepted loophole used as a last-gasp plea solely in grisly murder cases to
thwart the death penalty; that most successful pleaders are not truly mentally ill;
that most acquittals follow sharply contested "battles of the experts"; and that most
successful pleaders are sent for short stays to civil hospitals. 149 Although each of
these myths has been clearly, definitively, and empirically disproved,1 5 0 all of them
remain powerful and show no sign of abating.1 5 1 The abolitionist movement has
been fueled by politicians who focus on abolition as a panacea for urban crime
problems, 15 2 and legislative candidates point to insanity-defense support as indicia
of an opponent's being soft on crime. 153 Professor Stephen Morse has concluded
that "[w]e should not abolish the insanity defense unless we truly believe that
every perpetrator of a criminal act deserves to be punished, no matter how
crazy."l54
But these abolitionist arguments pale in comparison with the Comment on
Article 12 that reads the CRPD to purportedly demand the abolition of the defense
in all signatory nations. 155 According to that Comment:
In the area of criminal law, recognition of the legal capacity of persons with
disabilities requires abolishing a defence based on the negation of criminal
responsibility because of the existence of a mental or intellectual disability.
145. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 31(1)(a), Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.
146. See PERLIN, INSANITY DEFENSE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22, at 133-39.
147. Id. at 140. Empirically, and ironically, given the Comment to Article 14, in those jurisdictions in which the
insanity defense is abolished, there is often a statistically significant increase in the number of defendants found
permanently incompetent to stand trial. See Henry J. Steadman et al., Maintenance of an Insanity Defense Under
Montana's "Abolition" of the Insanity Defense, 146 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 357, 359-60 (1989).
148. This "common wisdom" is an exemplar of what I refer to as false "ordinary common sense" ("OCS"),
which has contaminated insanity-defense jurisprudence. See PERLIN, INSANITY DEFENSE JURISPRUDENCE, supra
note 22, at 305-10.
149. Perlin, Unpacking, supra note 95, at 707-08.
150. See Perlin, Nine Myths, supra note 25.
151. Perlin, Unpacking, supra note 95, at 707. See generally United States v. Lyons, 739 F.2d 994, 995-99 (5th
Cir. 1984) (Rubin, J., dissenting) (discussing the myths surrounding the insanity defense).
152. Such arguments were raised by certain members of Congress during the debate on the Insanity Defense
Reform Act that "parrot[ed] medieval views of the mentally disabled criminal defendant." PERLIN, INSANITY
DEFENSE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22, at 18. These pro-abolition statements by politicians were based on
empirical and behavioral myths. See id. at 18-24.
153. Perlin, Borderline, supra note 95, at 1406-07.
154. Morse, supra note 106, at 836.
155. U.N. Human Rights Council, supra note 14, ¶[47.
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Instead disability-neutral doctrines on the subjective element of the crime
should be applied, which take into consideration the situation of the individual
defendant. 156
I do not believe that these comments were drafted maliciously or with the intent to
harm persons with disabilities. But I believe this will be their effect, if
implemented. 157
This has been the topic of stunningly little commentary in legal literature to this
point. Professor Christopher Slobogin has written carefully about this Comment.
He has concluded that it fits within the model of what he calls the "integrationist"
approach to criminal law-providing persons with mental disabilities with "all of
the defenses that are available to criminal defendants without mental disabili-
ties." 1 5 With this in mind, he recasts the insanity defense in this way:
A person shall be excused for an offense if, at the time of the offense, he or she
(a) lacked the subjective mental state for the conduct, circumstance, or result
element of the crime; (b) believed circumstances existed that, if true, would
have justified the offense; (c) believed circumstances existed that, if true,
would have amounted to duress; provided that he or she did not cause any of
these mental states [by, inter alia, purposely avoiding treatment, aware that
such states would occur without such treatment]. 1 5 9
156. Id.
157. Although one should always be wary of "slippery slope" arguments, it does not appear to be a stretch to
suggest that the abolition of the incompetency status and the insanity defense would also call into question the
continued viability of U.S. Supreme Court decisions such as Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); and Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014), all proscribing the execution of the
"presently insane" and persons with intellectual disabilities. See generally PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 17-4
(extensively discussing this line of cases); MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABLITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE
SHAME OF THE STATES, 45-84 (2013) [hereinafter PERLIN, SHAME] (same).
158. Slobogin, Eliminating Mental Disability, supra note 25, at 304; see also Christopher Slobogin, An End to
Insanity: Recasting the Role ofMental Disability in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REv. 1199 (2000) [hereinafter
Slobogin, End to Insanity]. For a full explication of this theory, see Christopher Slobogin, A Defense of the
Integrationist Test as a Replacement for the Special Defense of Insanity, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 523 (2009)
[hereinafter Slobogin, Integrationist Test]. Slobogin premises his argument, in large part, on the argument that
"the subjectification of traditional criminal defenses is normatively required." Slobogin, Eliminating Mental
Disability, supra note 25, at 305.
159. Slobogin, Eliminating Mental Disability, supra note 25, at 306 (alteration in original) (quoting
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE WITH DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 56
(2006) [hereinafter SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE]). Slobogin's test has been endorsed in, for example, Arnold H.
Loewy, The Two Faces of Insanity, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 513 (2009) (arguing for a similar approach), though
other scholars have called it "arbitrary," Richard J. Bonnie, Why "Appreciation of Wrongfulness" Is a Morally
Preferable Standard for the Insanity Defense, Presentation at the Conference on the Affirmative Defense of
Insanity in Texas 59 (Feb. 7, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.txpsych.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/
insanitytranscript.pdf), and have criticized it for failing to exculpate all who should be exculpated by an insanity
defense, see, e.g., Susan D. Rozelle, Pure Insanity, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 543 (2009). The support for and
criticisms of this test are discussed in Slobogin, Integrationist Test, supra note 158, at 523-24, 523 n.5, 524
nn.6-8.
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In short, Slobogin-although recommending the elimination of the insanity
defense per se-endorses a finding of non-culpability in certain cases. He would
thus find a defendant not to be culpable if the defendant claimed, for example, "I
shot him because it was necessary to save the world from destruction by the
Klingon empire" (duress and mistake of fact), or, "I shot him because God [or the
devil] 1 6 0 told me to" (mistake of fact and, of course, a parallel to the biblical story
of Abraham and his son, as dramatized in the Bob Dylan song that gave this Article
its title). This is an insanity defense but is merely not characterized by Slobogin as
such. It must also be noted that in some jurisdictions, duress is not allowed as a
defense to homicide;1 6 1 in those jurisdictions, presumably, Slobogin's formulation
would not be allowed.
Slobogin has relied, in part, on my many discussions of sanism and how it
poisons all jurisprudence, in support of his position that the insanity defense must
be recast, noting that "[o]ne particularly insidious sanist notion, clearly belied by
the data, is that those with mental illness are abnormally dangerous."1 6 2 I agree
certainly, but I do not see this observation as requiring abolition of the insanity
defense. First, there is no causal correlation between the use of the insanity defense
and an underlying dangerous crime. 16 3 My research indicates that a victim died in
only a minority of cases in which the insanity defense was pleaded. 1 64 Second, the
assertion of an insanity defense need not necessarily lead to subsequent long-term
institutionalization.1 6 5 Also, if the evidence that is developed shows that a
160. See generally Grant H. Morris & Ansar Haroun, "God Told Me To Kill": Religion or Delusion?, 38 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 973 (2001). The "Klingon Empire" hypothetical is one that I often use in teaching this topic.
161. E.g., Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 971 N.E.2d 783, 792 (Mass. 2012); Joshua Dressler, Reflections on
Dudley and Stephens and Killing the Innocent: Taking a Wrong Conceptual Path, in THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND
THE CRIMINAL LAW: THE LEGACY OF GLANVILLE WILLIAMS 126, 128-29 (Dennis J. Baker & Jeremy Horder eds.,
2013) (discussing UK law). See generally Steven J. Mulroy, The Duress Defense's Uncharted Terrain: Applying It
to Murder Felony Murder, and the Mentally Retarded Defendant, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 159, 172-73 (2006)
(noting that most states, the federal courts, the U.S. military justice system, and virtually all international
common-law jurisdictions follow the common-law rule that duress cannot be a defense to murder).
Further, there are jurisdictions that reject a subjective self-defense standard, and no jurisdiction allows a fully
subjective self-defense standard. See, e.g., V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235,
1291 (2001); see also Alafair S. Burke, RationalActors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense, Not Syndromes,
out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 211, 287 n.308 (2002) (noting that under the Model Penal Code, when
a defendant's belief is not objectively reasonable, self-defense operates only to reduce a crime requiring purpose
or knowledge to a lesser offense requiring only recklessness or negligence).
162. Slobogin, End to Insanity, supra note 158, at 1244 (footnote omitted).
163. See PERLIN, INSANITY DEFENSE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22, at 109 (citing Rodriguez, LeWinn & Perlin,
supra note 105, at 402). Subsequent multistate studies revealed that less than one-sixth of all insanity pleaders
were charged with murder. See Lisa A. Callahan et al., The Volume and Characteristics of Insanity Defense Pleas:
An Eight-State Study, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 331, 336 (1991).
164. In one jurisdiction where this issue was carefully studied, less than one-third of successful insanity pleas
involved cases in which a victim died (a category far broader than simply "murder"). See PERLIN, INSANITY
DEFENSE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22, at 109; Callahan et al., supra note 163, at 336; see also supra text
accompanying note 163.
165. Insanity acquittals do lead to such long-term, post-acquittal commitments in many U.S. jurisdictions,
following the Supreme Court's utterly wrongheaded decision in Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983)
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defendant committed a certain act to save us from the Klingon empire or because
God (or the devil) ordained it, the jurors should logically conclude that the
defendant has a profound mental illness. I cannot believe that saying this mental
illness is part of a mistake-of-fact or duress defense will somehow diminish juror
sanism.
Beyond semantics, I disagree with Slobogin on two points. First, he discusses
the famous case of John Hinckley, the man who shot President Ronald Reagan and
was subsequently found not guilty by reason of insanity.1 6 6 At the time that
Hinckley was tried, the federal court in the District of Columbia employed the
American Law Institute-Model Penal Code ("ALI-MPC") insanity-defense stan-
dard, under the then-prevailing case, United States v. Brawner.1 6 7 Slobogin points
(rejecting arguments that it was unconstitutional to retain insanity acquittees for longer periods of time than the
maximum sentence for the underlying crime). But there are other jurisdictions, see, e.g., State v. Krol, 344 A.2d
289, 297 (N.J. 1975) (providing expanded procedural-due-process rights for insanity acquittees), that reject this
and take the position that "[t]he labels 'criminal commitment' and 'civil commitment' are of no constitutional
significance," id. I have noted that there is "great irony in the fact that the most expansive due process decision in
this area Krol-involves a defendant charged with murder, while the most restrictive decision -Jones-
involves a defendant charged with shoplifting." Perlin, Misdemeanor Outlaw, supra note 10, at 213 n.133.
Notwithstanding the Krol decision, insanity acquittees are often -because of sanist and political fears-retained
in maximum-security institutions for far longer than is clinically required. See, e.g., Grant T. Harris, Marnie E.
Rice & Catherine A. Cormier, Length of Detention in Matched Groups of Insanity Acquittees and Convicted
Offenders, 14 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 223 (1991); Eric Silver, Punishment or Treatment?: Comparing the
Lengths of Confinement of Successful and Unsuccessful Insanity Defendants, 19 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 375 (1995).
On how, in this context, persons with serious mental illness must be "rescue[d] ... from 'the vicissitudes of
political controversy,"' and the judicial branch must "establish basic tenets of decency 'as legal principles to be
applied by the courts,"' see Ellen Byers, Mentally Ill Criminal Offenders and the Strict Liability Effect: Is There
Hope for a Just Jurisprudence in an Era of Responsibility/Consequences Talk?, 57 ARK. L. REv. 447, 537 (2004)
(quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
Consider here the most famous U.S. insanity case of the twentieth century, that of John W. Hinckley. The final
report of the National Institute of Mental Health's Ad Hoc Forensic Advisory Panel, which was specifically
selected to review the policies and procedures of the St. Elizabeth's Hospital Forensic Division, where Hinckley
was housed, underscores the pragmatic issues afoot in such a case. The report notes that "[firom the perspective of
the Hospital, in controversial cases such as Hinckley, the U.S. Attorney's office can be counted upon to oppose
any conditional release recommendation." Final Report of the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) Ad
Hoc Forensic Advisory Panel, 12 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 77, 96 (1988). The bureaucratic issue is
not one of moral philosophy, of treatment philosophy, or of clinical conditions; it is the political reality that the
government will be sure to oppose the release of a "controversial" patient. See id.
166. For subsequent post-acquittal developments in Hinckley's case, see United States v. Hinckley, 462 F.
Supp. 2d 42 (D.D.C. 2006) (stating mother was capable of continuing to serve as responsible party of patient's
conditional release visits to her home); United States v. Hinckley, 292 F. Supp. 2d 125, 147-48 (D.D.C. 2003)
(denying unsupervised conditional release to custody of parents for thirty-six hours, but granting "highly
structured, limited conditional release" from hospital under supervision of parents). Most recently, Hinckley was
allowed conditional release of seventeen days each month to his mother's home, with certain conditions. See 35 F.
Supp. 3d 4 (D.D.C. 2014). Since then, he has been ordered released from St. Elizabeth's, after thirty-five years.
See Zoe Tillman, President Reagan Shooter John Hinckley Jr Granted Release, http://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/
2016/07/27/president-reagan-shooter-john-hinkley-jr-granted-release/?slreturn=20160629095406.
167. 471 F.2d 969, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law." (alteration in
original) (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962))).
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out that Hinckley would not have had a defense under his scheme, concluding that
the lack-of-appreciation and inability-to-conform prongs1 6" of the insanity-
defense test under which Hinckley was tried were "overbroad." 1 6 9 I disagree, as I
believe that the ALI-MPC test-employed at that time in the federal district of the
District of Columbia, where Hinckley was tried-was the appropriate test and was,
if anything, too narrow.1 7 0
But, more importantly, I believe that Hinckley's acquittal flowed not from the
wording of the test but rather from two other sources: (1) how the jurors perceived
the expert witnesses in Hinckley's case (finding the defendant's witnesses more
trustworthy and believable); 1 7 1 and, more importantly, (2) under federal law at the
time Hinckley was tried, once insanity was raised, the burden of proof shifted to
the government to disprove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt.17 2 This burden
was changed by the Insanity Defense Reform Act ("IDRA") in 1984,173 and I have
serious doubts as to whether Hinckley would have any chance of being acquitted
had the burden of proof required by the IDRA been in place. 174 In short, it was not
the use of the "expansive" substantive so-called "Brawner test"1 7 5 that led to the
not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity ("NGRI") verdict in Hinckley's case, but rather
the more generous burden of proof.1 7 6 The other point to make here is that the
168. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
169. Slobogin, Eliminating Mental Disability, supra note 25, at 307.
170. See generally PERLIN, INSANITY DEFENSE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22, at 89-9 1.
171. See CAPLAN, supra note 107, at 127.
172. See, e.g., Cynthia G. Hawkins-Le6n, "Literature as Law": The History of the Insanity Plea and a
Fictional Application Within the Law & Literature Canon, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 381, 400-01 (1999).
173. PERLIN, INSANITY DEFENSE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22, at 96-100.
174. Per the prevailing law in the District of Columbia at the time of the Hinckley trial, once the defendant
raised insanity, the Government had to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt. See Trial Tr. vol. 83, United States
v. Hinckley, Crim. No. 81-306 (D.D.C. June 18, 1982), reprinted in THE INSANITY DEFENSE: HEARINGS BEFORE
THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 183, 191-92 (1982). The
following instruction was given to the Hinckley jury:
The burden is on the Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt either that the defendant was
not suffering from a mental disease or defect on March 30, 1981, or else that he nevertheless had
substantial capacity on that date both to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law and to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.
Id. Under the Insanity Defense Reform Act, this burden shifted to the defendant to prove by clear and convincing
evidence. See 18 U.S.C. § 17(b).
175. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. On the differences between the Brawner test and the
M'Naghten test, see PERLIN, INSANITY DEFENSE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22, at 89-9 1.
176. But see GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 218 (1987) (questioning the significance of the burden of proof). It
is impossible, of course, to pinpoint exactly why a jury chose to decide a case as it did, and there were other
potential confounders here as well (e.g., the defense's use of then-nascent neuroscientific evidence; and the racial
composition of the jury, see generally CAPLAN, supra note 107, at 127), but, certainly, the verdict in the Hinckley
case was a major motivating force to include the change in burden in the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984.
See 18 U.S.C. § 17(b); U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3182, 3412 (1984) ("The
Committee is of the view that a more rigorous requirement than proof by a preponderance of the evidence is
necessary to assure that only those defendants who plainly satisfy the requirements of the defense are exonerated
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history of the insanity defense in the United States is one of persons with
legitimate insanity defenses being convicted by jurors in the face of overwhelming
evidence of insanity, not the specter of non-insane defendants being acquitted.1 7 7
The defense is, and always has been, underutilized.1 78  I fear that Slobogin's
formulation would lead to a greater underutilization.
My second concern with Slobogin's formulation relates to the defense's poten-
tial unavailability to a defendant who "cause[d]" his mental state by "purposely
avoiding treatment."1 7 9 I fear that, if accepted, this caveat could be used broadly
and bluntly to suppress the right to refuse the involuntary administration of
antipsychotic medication, a right that is otherwise protected by the CRPD as well
as by domestic law.18 0 Perhaps the Supreme Court's broadest statement in support
of the right to refuse came in the case of Riggins v. Nevada,"" applying the right in
the case of a competent defendant at his insanity-defense trial. 18 2 It is significant
that the valid and reliable research shows us that jurors believe that defendants
who refuse effective medication or therapy are responsible for their impaired
mental state at the time of the offense and are therefore blameworthy for their
crimes, regardless of what constitutional or statutory provisions may be in place in
a jurisdiction at that time. 18 3 I fear that Slobogin's formulation would greatly
diminish the constitutional scope of the right to refuse. 18 4
from what is otherwise culpable criminal behavior."). Also, there is some empirical evidence from other
jurisdictions (i.e., Georgia and New York) that revealed that a shift in the burden of proof reduced the rate of
insanity pleas in those states. See PERLIN, INSANITY DEFENSE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22, at 100 (citing HENRY
J. STEADMAN ETAL., BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY: EVALUATING INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM 107-41 (1993)).
177. Michael L. Perlin, "She Breaks Just Like a Little Girl": Neonaticide, the Insanity Defense, and the
Irrelevance of "Ordinary Common Sense," 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 2-3 (2003) [hereinafter Perlin,
Neonaticide]; MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 237-38 (2000)
[hereinafter PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE].
178. The assumption that the defense is overused is flatly wrong:
A broad-based examination of insanity defense cases demonstrates, beyond any doubt, that when
jurors err, they are globally more likely to commit the error of the false negative: overwhelmingly,
they reject the insanity defense in cases of defendants who authentically should have been found to
have met the standard for criminal nonresponsibility.
Perlin, Neonaticide, supra note 177, at 18. The insanity defense is used in, at the most, 1% of felony cases, and is
successful about 25% of the time. PERLIN, INSANITY DEFENSE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22, at 108.
179. Slobogin, Eliminating Mental Disability, supra note 25, at 306 (quoting SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE,
supra note 159, at 56). It is significant, I think, that Slobogin bracketed this phrase, most likely reflecting, in his
own mind, an ambivalence as to whether this portion of his formula would be accepted as part of a new definition.
180. See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, §§ 8-1 to 8-14.
181. 504 U.S. 127, 135-37 (1992).
182. On how courts construe cases in which insanity pleaders fail to take medication prior to the commission
of the act leading to arrest and trial, see, for example, Crawford v. State, 415 S.E.2d 300 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992);
People v. Curry, 588 N.E.2d 423 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); McFarland v. State, 581 So. 2d 1249 (Ala. Crim. App.
1991).
183. Jennifer L. Skeem & Stephen L. Golding, Describing Jurors'Personal Conceptions ofInsanity and Their
Relationship to Case Judgments, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 561, 609 (2001).
184. On the related question of the involuntary administration of medication in jail and prison settings, see
Alan R. Felthous, Enforced Medication in Jails and Prisons: The New Asylums, 8 ALB. Gov'T L. REV. 563 (2015).
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Slobogin points out that the "purposely avoiding treatment" language1  "would
not afford a person with mental disability an excuse if the impairments that led to a
lack of mens rea or a belief that force was necessary were caused by the person's
failure to sustain mental health treatment."'1 6 But, as this language is in the
disjunctive, it would also control the case of a person charged with a nonviolent
offense lacking in mens rea. Beyond this, Slobogin cites to the well-accepted
doctrine that one cannot plead a defense if one caused the condition of one's
excuse, using the examples of "abus[ing] psychoactive substances or knowingly
plac[ing] themselves in harm's way.""" But there is a world of difference-both
legal difference and "real life" difference-between these examples and the
example of one who wishes to assert an otherwise constitutionally protected right
to refuse the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medications.18 9 Slobogin
concludes that "[t]he Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is a
groundbreaking document[ that, t]aken seriously,... should revolutionize laws
that govern people with mental disability." 90 But I believe that the revolution that
might be driven by these General Comment recommendations is the wrong one,
and one that should be avoided at all costs.
The most prominent disability-rights advocate who has enthusiastically en-
dorsed the views discussed here is Tina Minkowitz, President and founder of the
Center for the Human Rights of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry, and the
representative of World Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry in the CRPD
drafting process.1 91 Minkowitz-who connects her opposition to the insanity
defense to her opposition to forensic psychiatry and to TJ-argues that "the
On the international human-rights implications of such drugging, see CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & HUMANITARIAN
LAw, supra note 4, at 143.
185. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
186. Slobogin, Eliminating Mental Disability, supra note 25, at 306.
187. Id. ("A person shall be excused for an offense if, at the time of the offense, he or she (a) lacked the
subjective mental state for the conduct, circumstance, or result element of the crime; (b) believed circumstances
existed that, if true, would have justified the offense; (c) believed circumstances existed that, if true, would have
amounted to duress; provided that he or she did not cause any of these mental states [by, inter alia, purposely
avoiding treatment, aware that such states would occur without such treatment]." (alteration in original)).
188. See id. But see Commonwealth v. Shin, 16 N.E.3d 1122, 1128 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014) (stating that even if
defendant knows that discontinuing medication may result in the subsequent commission of crimes, that decision
does not deprive him of the ability to claim lack of substantial capacity).
189. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Keri K. Gould & Deborah A. Dorfman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Mentally Disabled Persons: Hopeless Oxymoron or Path to Redemption?, 1
PSYCHOL. PUB. PoL'Y & L. 80, 111 (1995). This may be because of side effects, interference with mentation,
impact to meaningfully consult with counsel, or other legally valid reasons. On the significance of the drugs'
potential impact on the right to participate in one's defense, see Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 144 (1992).
190. Slobogin, Eliminating Mental Disability, supra note 25, at 319.
191. See generally Michael L. Perlin, "I Might Need a Good Lawyer Could Be Your Funeral, My Trial":
Global Clinical Legal Education and the Right to Counsel in Civil Commitment Cases, 28 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y
241, 261 (2008) ("Although there is a robust 'psychiatric survivor' movement both in the United States and
elsewhere, this voice is typically ignored." (citing Peter Margulies, The Cognitive Politics of Professional
Conflict: Law Reform, Mental Health Treatment Technology, and Citizen Self- Governance, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
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capacity to be held accountable for harm done to others or to the community [is] a
corollary of the capacity to exercise rights, assume obligations and create legal
relationships."1 92 She concludes that the insanity defense is contrary to Article 12
of the CRPD "because it undermines the equal recognition of persons with
disabilities before the law as individuals with mutual obligations towards others
and an equal right to participate in defining and negotiating those obligations."193
I agree with Minkowitz that the insanity defense, as currently utilized, is often
"legally and socially stigmatizing," that insanity acquittals often do not result in
release from custody, and that insanity acquittees are often held in forensic
facilities for longer than is warranted by the underlying crimes with which they
were charged. 194 And I agree fully that, historically, many of those who have been
found not guilty by reason of insanity were the victims of grossly inadequate
counsel. 1 95 The example of Michael Jones, who was locked up for decades
following an insanity acquittal on a charge of attempted shoplifting, 196 is one of
the saddest examples of this reality. 1 97
But to say that these realities should lead us to abolish the insanity defense not
only throws out the baby with the bathwater, but also throws out the tub and the
entire plumbing system as well. I support the insanity defense because I believe
that exculpation of some individuals based on mental state is essential to a mature
and coherent system of criminal law. It is not the insanity defense that causes the
abuses that Minkowitz correctly catalogues, but rather the administration of the
post-insanity-defense-acquittal case disposition and institutionalization system. 198
That is where our attention should be focused.
By way of example, Carole Petersen, noting that it is doubtful that legislatures
would ever accept Minkowitz's (or even Slobogin's) position,1 99 thoughtfully
argues that it would be "more prudent to propose reforms to the current defenses,
25, 56 n.132, 57-58 (1992))). For an interactionist model of the psychiatric-survivor movement, see Laura
Guidry-Grimes, Modelling Psychiatric Disability, 21 J. EVALUATION CLINICAL PRAC. 490 (2015).
192. Minkowitz, Some Thoughts, supra note 16.
193. Minkowitz, Rethinking Criminal Responsibility, supra note 16, at 447. Minkowitz does not discuss
whether there are other special considerations at play in the cases of defendants with intellectual disabilities. On
the differences in how competency should be assessed in cases of persons with intellectual disabilities and persons
with mental illnesses (and on the legal system's failure to differentiate between these conditions), see, for
example, Haleigh Reisman, Competency of the Mentally Ill and Intellectually Disabled in the Courts, 11
J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICALL. 199 (2015).
194. Minkowitz, Some Thoughts, supra note 16; see also PERLIN, INSANITY DEFENSE JURISPRUDENCE, supra
note 22, at 110-11.
195. Minkowitz, Some Thoughts, supra note 16; see PERLIN, SHAME, supra note 157, at 123 -34.
196. See Perlin, Misdemeanor Outlaw, supra note 10, at 213 n.133.
197. On how sanism globally infects the representation of persons with mental disabilities, see Michael L.
Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "Mr. Bad Example": Why Lawyers Need to Embrace Therapeutic Jurisprudence to
Root out Sanism in the Representation of Persons with Mental Disabilities, 16 Wyo. L. REV. 299 (2016).
198. Id.
199. But see Cruse v. Florida, 588 So. 2d 983, 989 (Fla. 1991). Cruse affirmed a conviction in which this
charge-very much like Slobogin's suggested language-was used:
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providing stronger safeguards and more regular review of detention orders for
defendants who are either deemed unfit for trial or relied upon disability-based
defenses." 2 0 0 The Krol case, in New Jersey, gives us a blueprint as to how these
reviews can and should take place.20 1 It is a tragedy that this blueprint has not been
embraced by other jurisdictions.
I have found little in Minkowitz's work that deals with the reality that I think we
all must focus on in this discussion: what will happen to this cadre of defendants if
there is no insanity defense? Elsewhere, Minkowitz does note her opposition to the
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. These Rules are a
non-binding declaration that has been widely used as an international normative
standard for prison management and policy, and that provides that "persons who
are found to be insane shall not be detained in prisons and arrangements shall be
made to remove them to mental institutions as soon as possible," noting that "the
disability community and the Special Rapporteur on Torture have urged deletion of
this rule." 202 There are two important issues to consider. First, there is no evidence
that "the disability community" as a whole is in agreement on this position.
Second, there is no question in my mind that the immediate result of the abolition
of the insanity defense would be the long-term incarceration of the population in
question in prisons that we know are dangerous and life-threatening to this
population.20 3
A person may be legally sane in accordance with the instructions previously given and still yet, by
reason of mental infirmity, have hallucinations or delusions which cause him to honestly believe to
be facts things which are not true or real. The guilt of a person suffering from such hallucinations
or delusions is to be determined just as though the hallucinations or delusions were actual facts. If
the act of the defendant would have been lawful had the hallucinations or delusions been the actual
facts, the defendant is not guilty of the crime.
Id.
200. Carole J. Petersen, Addressing Violations of Human Rights in Forensic Psychiatric Institutions:
Philosophical and Strategic Debates, Remarks Before the American Society of International Law (2015), in 109
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING 82 (2015).
201. See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 14-2.1.1. The court in Krol read the U.S. Supreme Court cases of
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), and Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), as "plainly attempt[ing] to
enunciate a broad principle-that the fact that the person to be committed has previously engaged in criminal acts
is not a constitutionally acceptable basis for imposing upon him a substantially different standard or procedure for
involuntary commitment," and stated that "the labels 'criminal commitment' and 'civil commitment' are of no
constitutional significance." Krol, 344 A.2d at 297. On how Krol "provid[ed] expanded procedural due process
rights for insanity acquittees," see Perlin, Misdemeanor Outlaw, supra note 10, at 195 n.15.
202. Minkowitz, Rethinking Criminal Responsibility, supra note 16, at 436.
203. Interestingly, when Montana abolished its insanity defense, researchers demonstrated that there was a
concomitant, statistically significant increase in the number of defendants found permanently incompetent to
stand trial, and that the state housed those defendants in the same facilities where it previously housed insanity
acquittees. See Perlin, Borderline, supra note 95, at 1423 n.316 (discussing research reported in Rita D.
Buitendorp, A Statutory Lesson from "Big Sky Country" on Abolishing the Insanity Defense, 30 VAL. U. L. REv.
965, 993-96 (1996), and in Steadman et al., supra note 147, at 359-60). But, of course, Montana did not abolish
(nor could it have abolished) the incompetency status. One partial solution would be to improve the quality of life
in prisons. But the reports done by Human Rights Watch and other similar groups, discussed earlier in this Article,
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I see no consideration of the realities of seriously mentally ill defendants-
imprisoned because of the absence of a non-responsibility defense-in Minkow-
itz's writings, and it is her failure to address this that concerns me the most. 20 4
IV. TREATMENT OF PERSONS WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES IN PRISONS
It is necessary to focus on what happens to persons with mental disabilities
when they are imprisoned. A recent exhaustive report erases any shred of doubt
that persons with mental disabilities are regularly brutalized and tortured in prison
settings.2 05 First, there is no dispute that "most jails and prisons do not conform to
nationally accepted guidelines for mental health screening and treatment."20 6 As a
group, persons with mental disabilities are frequently and disproportionally the
victims of violence and abuse inside correctional settings.20 7 In this context, sexual
victimization is a significant concern for incarcerated people, "particularly those
with mental disabilities."20 8
This is a reality that must be acknowledged in any conversation about the CRPD
or the abolition of the insanity defense and incompetency status. In its report,
"Callous and Cruel: Use of Force Against Inmates with Mental Disabilities in US
suggest that this would be nearly impossible. An alternative would be to seek diversion from prisons to
community mental-health systems. See, e.g., Megan Testa, Imprisonment of the Mentally Ill: A Call for Diversion
to the Community Mental Health System, 8 ALB. Gov'T L. REV. 405 (2015). See generally Terry A. Kupers, A
Community Mental Health Model in Corrections, 26 STAN. L. & PocY REV. 119 (2015).
204. There is evidence that in many jurisdictions, including some states in Australia, a person who is found
unfit or not guilty because of insanity will be imprisoned because there are no alternative facilities. See Girard
Dorney, Prisons Are Acting as De Facto Mental Health Facilities for Indigenous Australians, VICE (Apr. 30,
2015, 8:00 PM), https://www.vice.com/en us/article/a-look-at-indigenous-mental-health-inside-australias-prison-
system. Significantly, this happens mostly in those states (i.e., Northern Territory and Western Australia) that have
the largest indigenous populations.
In Albania, persons with mental disabilities who have been charged with a criminal offense reside in a prison
unit and must comply with prison rules while institutionalized. Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights
Law and Comparative Mental Disability Law: The Universal Factors, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 333, 354
(2007) (citing Harvey Weinstein, Ira Burnim & Robert Okin, Protecting the Mentally Disabled, CARNEGIE
COUNCIL (May 6, 2001), http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/archive/dialogue/2_06/onlineexclusive
654.html). I am also concerned that this debate will, in Paul Appelbaum's perceptive words, "distract attention
from the positive changes that the convention could make for the rights of persons with disabilities." Appelbaum,
supra note 31, at 368.
205. See generally E. Lea Johnston, Vulnerability and Just Desert: A Theory of Sentencing and Mental Illness,
103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147 (2013) ("[O]ffenders with serious mental illnesses are more likely than
non-ill offenders to suffer physical and sexual assaults. . . ."); E. Lea Johnston, Conditions of Confinement at
Sentencing: The Case of Seriously Disordered Offenders, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 625 (2014) (same). For a state
example, see Jonathan D. LeCompte, When Cruel Becomes the Usual: The Mistreatment of Mentally Ill Inmates
in South Carolina Prisons, 66 S.C. L. REV. 751 (2015).
206. Henry A. Dlugacz, Correctional Mental Health in the USA, 10 INT'L J. PRISONER HEALTH 3, 10 (2014)
(citing STEVEN K. HOGE ET AL., AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, OUTPATIENT SERVICES FOR THE MENTALLY ILL INVOLVED IN
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2009)).
207. Dlugacz, supra note 206, at 10 (citing Michael L. Perlin & Henry A. Dlugacz, "It's Doom Alone that
Counts": Can International Human Rights Law Be an Effective Source of Rights in Correctional Conditions
Litigation?, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 675 (2009); Dlugacz & Wimmer, supra note 57, at 362-63).
208. Id.
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Jails and Prisons," Human Rights Watch ("HRW") charged that jail and prison
staff regularly use "unnecessary, excessive, or malicious . . . force against prison-
ers with mental disabilities." 2 0 9 The report concludes:
Corrections officials at times needlessly and punitively deluge them with
chemical sprays; shock them with electric stun devices; strap them to chairs
and beds for days on end; break their jaws, noses, ribs; or leave them with
lacerations, second degree burns, deep bruises, and damaged internal organs.
The violence can traumatize already vulnerable men and women, aggravating
their symptoms and making future mental health treatment more difficult. In
some cases, including several documented in this report, the use of force has
caused or contributed to prisoners' deaths.210
Jamie Fellner, author of the report and U.S. program senior adviser at HRW,
concludes that such facilities "can be dangerous, damaging, and even deadly
places for men and women with mental health problems." 2 1 1 The report identified
policies and practices that led to unwarranted force, based on a review of hundreds
of individual court cases, class-action cases, and Justice Department investiga-
tions, and based on interviews with more than 125 current and former corrections
officials, use-of-force experts, psychiatrists, and prisoner advocates. 2 12
This report offers multiple recommendations: (1) public officials should reduce
the number of prisoners with mental disabilities confined in prisons and jails,
including by increasing the availability of community mental-health resources and
access to criminal-justice diversion programs; (2) officials should also improve
mental-health services in prisons and jails and ensure that correctional facilities
adopt and follow sound policies on using force that consider the unique needs and
vulnerabilities of prisoners with mental illness; 2 13 and (3) officials should use
training to enforce these policies and include mechanisms for holding accountable
staff who violate them.2 14
These recommendations should not be surprising to anyone who follows
developments in this area. At the outset, "there is no evidence that prisoners with
psychiatric disabilities are receiving constitutionally adequate treatment."2 15 Prison
209. United States: Force Against Prisoners with Mental Illness, HUM. RTs. WATCH 4 (May 12, 2015, 12:00
AM) [hereinafter HRW, Force], https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/12/united-states-force-against-prisoners-
mental-illness. On how such cruel treatment has become "usual" in this context, see LeCompte, supra note 205.
210. Callous and Cruel, HUM. RTs. WATCH 2 (May 12, 2015) [hereinafter HRW, Cruel], https://www.hrw.org/
report/2015/05/12/callous-and-cruelluse-force-against-inmates-mental-disabilities-us-jails-and.
211. HRW, Force, supra note 209, at 2.
212. HRW, Cruel, supra note 210, at 7.
213. For a therapeutic-based analysis of the requirement that correctional staff and facilities provide special
protection to vulnerable inmates such as those discussed here, see Warren Brookbanks, Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence and Its Role in Corrections, in THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: NEW ZEALAND PERSPECTIVES 163, 170-71
(Warren Brookbanks ed., 2015).
214. New Zealand has taken steps to implement such policies. See id.
215. Simon & Rosenbaum, supra note 80, at 43-44.
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sentences violate the Eighth Amendment when they continue past the point where
further incarceration will deepen the prisoner's psychiatric disabilities.2 16 In
Brown v. Plata,217 the Supreme Court relied on language it used in a prison-medical-
care case from forty years ago in finding that a prison's failure to provide adequate
mental-health care may produce torture. 2 18 About 30% of inmates in solitary
confinement are mentally ill.21 9 Remarkably, the average solitary-confinement
sentence for New York inmates with mental illness is also six times longer than
that of the general inmate population, 2 2 0 and there is robust evidence that solitary
confinement is used disproportionately in cases involving victims of sexual assault
by prison guards. 2 2 1 The use of solitary confinement in such cases is inevitably
counterproductive. 2 2 2 Prisoners with mental-health problems serve longer than
prisoners convicted of like offenses without such problems, and only about
one-third of all prisoners with mental-health problems receive treatment while
216. See Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1244-45, 1258-59 (N.D. Cal. 1995). On settings, see Felthous,
supra note 184 (discussing the administration of enforced medication in non-medical correctional facilities, and
recommending that individuals receive enforced medication in mental hospitals).
217. 563 U.S. 493 (2011). See generally Henry Dlugacz & Christopher Wimmer, LegalAspects ofAdminister-
ingAntipsychotic Medications to Jail and Prison Inmates, 36 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY 213 (2013) (discussing the
legal standards regarding informed consent and forcible administration of medication in correctional institutions).
218. Brown, 563 U.S. at 510 ("To incarcerate, society takes from prisoners the means to provide for their own
needs. Prisoners are dependent on the State for food, clothing, and necessary medical care. A prison's failure to
provide sustenance for inmates 'may actually produce physical "torture or a lingering death."' (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976))).
219. Jessica Knowles, "The Shameful Wall of Exclusion ": How Solitary Confinement for Inmates with Mental
Illness Violates the Americans with Disabilities Act, 90 WASH. L. REV. 893, 907 (2015) (citing ACLU NAT'L
PRISON PROJECT, ACLU BRIEFING PAPER: THE DANGEROUS OVERUSE OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 6 (2013)). See generally Elizabeth Alexander, "This Experiment, So Fatal": Some Initial Thoughts on
Strategic Choices in the Campaign Against Solitary Confinement, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REv. 1 (2015) (discussing
isolated confinement in America and litigation challenges to the practice). Similar findings have been made in
European studies. See Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y
325, 342 (2006) (discussing the exacerbation of existing mental conditions that results from solitary confinement);
Henrik Steen Andersen, Mental Health in Prison Populations: A Review-with Special Emphasis on a Study of
Danish Prisoners on Remand, 110 ACTAPSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA SUPPLEMENTUM 5, 50 (2004) (discussing the
prevalence of mentally ill individuals in solitary confinement and in prisons generally). For a relevant historical
overview, see Michael B. Mushlin, "I Am Opposed to this Procedure": How Kafka's In the Penal Colony
Illuminates the Current Debate About Solitary Confinement and Oversight ofAmerican Prisons, 93 OR. L. REV.
571 (2015). This is to say not that all these prisoners should have been found not guilty by reason of insanity
(though, certainly, some should have, see sources cited supra note 151), but rather that the elimination of the
insanity defense will make this wretched situation even worse.
220. Knowles, supra note 219, at 896 (citing HUM. RTs. WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS
WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 147, 147-48 (2003)). In her article, Knowles argues that American solitary-confinement
policies violate the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Id. at 893-94; see also Mary T. Zdanowicz,
Keeping the Mentally Ill out of Jail: Sheriffs as Litigants, 8 ALB. Gov'T L. REV. 536, 537 (2015) (discussing the
ADA as a potential litigation tool); Alexander, supra note 219, at 33-34 (same).
221. Kim Shayo Buchanan, Impunity: Sexual Abuse in Women's Prisons, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 45, 66
(2007).
222. Bandy X. Lee & Maya Prabhu, A Reflection on the Madness in Prisons, 26 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 253,
259-60 (2015).
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imprisoned.2 23 Half of all prison suicides are committed by persons with serious
mental illness. 2 24 The abolition of the insanity defense and the incompetency
status-leading directly to more persons with serious mental illnesses being
imprisoned-will inevitably increase these abysmal rates.
This problem is not limited to the United States. The treatment of aboriginal
individuals with mental disabilities in Australian prisons is a national scandal.2 25 A
significant number of aboriginal people with cognitive impairment are currently
being held in maximum-security prisons, despite not having been convicted of or
sentenced for a crime that would require them to be held in such facilities. 226
Studies of Canadian prisons indicate that heightened use of solitary confinement
further isolates persons with mental disabilities.22 7 Anyone who has worked "on
the ground" in the general correctional setting knows that many guards believe that
this cohort of defendants is merely feigning and manipulative, and those guards
thus seek to punish them for "gaming the system." 2 28 This is another aspect of
institutional sanism. 2 2 9
Persons with mental disabilities are especially stigmatized in prison settings; the
disability becomes the stigma.230 Sanism is especially pernicious in institutional
223. DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF
PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 9 (2006).
224. Kanya D'Almeida, In US Prisons, Psychiatric Disability Is Often Met by Brute Force, TRUTHOUT (July
18, 2015, 12:00AM), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/31886-in-us-prisons-psychiatric-disability-is-often-met-
by-brute-force#.
225. See, e.g., Aboriginal Disability Justice Campaign, PEOPLE WITH DISABILITY, http://www.pwd.org.au/adjc/
about-us-adjc.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2016). See generally MINDY SOTIRI ET AL., ABORIGINAL DISABILITY
JUSTICE CAMPAIGN, No END IN SIGHT: THE IMPRISONMENT, AND INDEFINITE DETENTION OF INDIGENOUS AUSTRA-
LIANS WITH A COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT 7 (2012) (discussing the overrepresentation of indigenous Australians with
cognitive impairment in the criminal-justice system). One study has found that the overall incidence of
psychiatric disorder for Australian prisoners has reached 80%. See Tony Butler et al., Mental Disorders in
Australian Prisoners: A Comparison with a Community Sample, 40 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 272, 273
(2006).
226. SOTIRI ET AL., supra note 225, at 7.
227. Syrus Ware, Joan Ruzsa & Giselle Dias, It Can't Be Fixed Because It's Not Broken: Racism and Disability
in the Prison Industrial Complex, in DISABILITY INCARCERATED: IMPRISONMENT AND DISABILITY IN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA 163, 168 (Liat Ben-Moshe et al. eds., 2014).
228. E-mail from Henry A. Dlugacz, Esq., to author (Aug. 8, 2015, 11:06 AM) (on file with author). Dlugacz's
law practice focuses on "mental health-related matters, with a particular emphasis on the monitoring and
mediation of complex class action lawsuits involving correctional systems of treatment, forensic hospitals,
reentry planning, and community-based systems." Henry Dlugacz, BELDOCK LEVINE & HOFFMAN LLP,
http://www.blhny.com/#!henry-dlugacz/cevk (last visited Nov. 19, 2016). On how prison guards exercise
institutional control in Norway, see Alexander Z. Ibsen, Ruling by Favors: Prisons Guards'Informal Exercise of
Institutional Control, 38 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 342 (2013).
229. See SASHA ABRAMSKY & JAMIE FELLNER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND
OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 106 (2003) ("Security staff, who lack mental health training, are often quick to
assume that prisoners are acting volitionally or manipulatively when they act out.").
230. Carrie Griffin Basas & Lisa Peters, Deprivation and "Deviance": The Disability and Health Experiences
of Women in North Carolina's Prisons, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1223, 1247-48 (2015).
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settings, 2 3 1 and its power in jails and prisons is particularly vicious. 2 3 2 Indeed,
there are some who argue that, at least in the cases of juveniles, there should be an
entirely separate justice system for mentally ill offenders, modeled after currently
existing mental-health courts.23 3 What is most perplexing is that scholars and
disability-rights advocates-such as Janet Lord-have focused their attention on
the reality that "[just as] poor conditions for detention in prisons . . . may amount
to torture or other ill-treatment, practices that involve the use of restraints or
seclusion similarly require serious scrutiny under Article 15 [of the CRPD]."2 34 In
short, persons with mental illness are regularly tortured in America's jails and
prisons, and we have known this for years.2 35 Lord notes further that "close
monitoring of the living conditions of persons with disabilities in prisons and other
institutional settings is essential."2 36 An influx of an additional population of
persons with mental illness-likely far more mentally ill than the "typical"
prisoner-will do nothing but exacerbate this level of torture. Tellingly, the
abolition of the insanity defense or the incompetency status is not among any of
HRW's recommendations.
231. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "Through the Wild Cathedral Evening": Barriers, Attitudes, Participatory
Democracy, Professor tenBroek, and the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities, 13 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R.
413, 417-18 (2007) (discussing the prevalence of sanism and stereotypes about disability and the need to allow
persons with disabilities to participate in society and exercise their legal capacity).
232. On how sanism -"manifested ... by a refusal to take seriously the issues that affect persons with mental
disabilities, especially institutionalized persons-is the root cause of [the wholesale violation of human rights of
this population]," see Perlin & Dlugacz, supra note 207, at 688 n. 100.
233. Cf Mona Sobhani, Extending the Logic of the Juvenile Justice System to a Separate Justice System for
Mentally Ill Offenders, 8 ALB. Gov'T L. REV. 439, 441 (2015) (applying "the logic of the juvenile justice system to
argue for a separate justice system for severely mentally ill offenders"). Importantly, in a recent article, Professor
David Katner argued persuasively that the presumption of competency regularly employed in the juvenile justice
system should be abandoned and that the party seeking an adjudication should be responsible for establishing that
the accused juvenile is in fact competent to stand trial. See David R. Katner, Eliminating the Competency
Presumption in Juvenile Delinquency Cases, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 403, 403 (2015). The proposed
abolition of the incompetency status, of course, flies squarely in the face of Professor Katner's thoughtful
suggestion.
On mental-health courts in general, see Michael Perlin, "There Are No Trials Inside the Gates of Eden":
Mental Health Courts, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dignity and the Promise of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in COERCIVE CARE: RIGHTS, LAW AND POLICY 193 (Bernadette McSherry & Ian
Freckelton eds., 2013) [hereinafter Perlin, No Trials Inside Eden]. This topic is beyond the scope of this paper.
234. Janet E. Lord, Shared Understanding or Consensus-Masked Disagreement? The Anti-Torture Framework
in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 33 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 27, 60 (2010);
see also McSherry & Gooding, supra note 37, at 712 (discussing U.N. report on the presence of torture and
mistreatment throughout different countries' healthcare practices).
235. See, e.g., Avlana K. Eisenberg, Incarceration Incentives in the Decarceration Era, 69 VAND. L. REV. 71,
102, 102 n.177 (2016).
236. Lord, supra note 234, at 49. Some advocate how the adoption of a community mental health model might
somewhat remediate the current situation. See Terry A. Kupers, A Community Mental Health Model in
Corrections, 26 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REv. 119, 123-25 (2015).
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V. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
How does this all fit with therapeutic jurisprudence? 237 As TJ "asks us to look at
law as it actually impacts people's lives" 238 and "focuses on the law's impact on
emotional life and psychological well-being,"2 39 it forces us to look at the "real
world" implications of the abolition arguments to determine whether such aboli-
tion would be consonant with TJ aims and aspirations.
The ultimate aim of TJ is to determine whether legal rules, procedures, and roles
for lawyers can or should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while
not subordinating due-process principles.240 There is an inherent tension in this
inquiry, but David Wexler clearly identifies how it must be resolved: the law's use
of "mental health information to improve therapeutic functioning [cannot] im-
pinge upon justice concerns."2" It is vital to keep in mind that "an inquiry into
therapeutic outcomes does not mean that therapeutic concerns 'trump' civil rights
and civil liberties." 2 4 2 In its aim to use the law to empower individuals, enhance
rights, and promote well-being, TJ has been described as "a sea-change in ethical
thinking about the role of law . . . a movement towards a more distinctly relational
approach to the practice of law . . . which emphasise[s] psychological wellness
237. Portions of this section are adapted from Perlin & Lynch, Sexless Patients, supra note 131, at 277-79;
Michael L. Perlin, "John Brown Went off to War": Considering Veterans Courts as Problem-Solving Courts, 37
NOVA L. REV. 445, 452-55 (2013) [hereinafter Perlin, John Brown]; Michael L. Perlin & Naomi M. Weinstein,
"Friend to the Martyr a Friend to the Woman of Shame": Thinking About the Law, Shame and Humiliation, 24 S.
CAL. REV. L. & Soc. JusT. 1, 9-13 (2014); Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "Had to Be Held down by Big
Police": A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective on Interactions Between Police and Persons with Mental
Disabilities, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (2017) [hereinafter Perlin & Lynch, Interactions with Police]. It also distills a
significant portion of my work over the past two decades. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, What Is Therapeutic
Jurisprudence?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 623 (1993).
238. Winick, supra note 24, at 535.
239. Wexler, supra note 24, at 45.
240. See Perlin, Role and Significance of Counsel, supra note 24, at 751; Perlin, Sexual Autonomy, supra note
39, at 510 n.139; Perlin, Guardians and Protectors, supra note 27, at 1184; see also Michael L. Perlin, "Baby,
Look Inside Your Mirror": The Legal Profession's Willful and Sanist Blindness to Lawyers with Mental
Disabilities, 69 PIrr. L. REV. 589, 591 (2008) (discussing how therapeutic justice may help combat sanism and
stigmas associated with mental disorders in the law); Bernard P. Perlmutter, George's Story: Voice and
Transformation Through the Teaching and Practice of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in a Law School Child
Advocacy Clinic, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 561, 599 ni111 (2005) (citing Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment Hearing, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUEs 37, 46-47 (1999) (discussing
how lawyers can help to reform civil commitment hearings to improve patients' perceptions of fairness within
such hearings)); Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The Price and
Risks ofInfluence, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 575, 585-86 (2008) (discussing the role that TJ should play in judicial
decision-making).
241. See David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Conceptions of Legal Scholarship, 11
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 17, 21 (1993); David B. Wexler, Applying the Law Therapeutically, 5 APPLIED & PREVENTIVE
PSYCHOL. 179, 185 (1996).
242. Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 CIN. L. REV. 407, 412 (2000) [hereinafter Perlin, Law of
Healing]; Perlin, Us and Them, supra note 98, at 782.
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over adversarial triumphalism."24 3 That is, TJ supports an ethic of care.2 44
One of the central principles of TJ is a commitment to dignity.2 4 5 No explana-
tion of how the legal process should implement TJ is better than Professor Amy
Ronner's description of the "three Vs": voice, validation, and voluntariness.24 6 She
argues the following:
What "the three Vs" commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a sense of
voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If that litigant feels that
the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard, and taken seriously the litigants
[sic] story, the litigant feels a sense of validation. When litigants emerge from a
legal proceeding with a sense of voice and validation, they are more at peace
with the outcome. Voice and validation create a sense of voluntary participa-
tion, one in which the litigant experiences the proceeding as less coercive.
Specifically, the feeling on the part of litigants that they voluntarily partook in
the very process that engendered the end result or the very judicial pronuncia-
tion that affects their own lives can initiate healing and bring about improved
behavior in the future. In general, human beings prosper when they feel that
247
they are making, or at least participating in, their own decisions.
Is the abolition of the insanity defense and the incompetency status consonant with
or dissonant with TJ? I believe that the positions that I staked out on these
questions fifteen years ago are still the correct ones-that, in the context of TJ: (1)
the insanity defense is therapeutic;m (2) the substantive standard and procedural
rules matter; 249 (3) current post-acquittal rules that follow the U.S. Supreme
243. Warren Brookbanks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Conceiving an Ethical Framework, 8 J.L. & MED. 328,
329-30 (2001); see also Bruce J. Winick, Overcoming Psychological Barriers to Settlement: Challenges for the
TJLawyer, in THE AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: PRACTICING LAW AS A HEALING PROFESSION 341 (Marjorie
A. Silver ed., 2007) (discussing the role of lawyers as therapeutic agents when representing clients); Bruce J.
Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law School Clinical Education:
Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 605, 605-06 (2006) (discussing the rise of TJ as a
new form of lawyering that incorporates planning and sensitivity). See generally Carol Gilligan, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982) (discussing the phrase "therapeutic
jurisprudence").
244. See Gregory Baker, Do You Hear the Knocking at the Door? A "Therapeutic" Approach to Enriching
Clinical Legal Education Comes Calling, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 379, 385 (2006); Brookbanks, supra note 243;
David B. Wexler, Not Such a Party Pooper: An Attempt to Accommodate (Many of) Professor Quinn's Concerns
About Therapeutic Jurisprudence Criminal Defense Lawyering, 48 B.C. L. REv. 597, 599 (2007); Winick &
Wexler, supra note 243, at 605-07.
245. See BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVW COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 161 (2005).
246. Ronner, supra note 40, at 627; see also Freckelton, supra note 240, at 588 (discussing the importance of
"voice").
247. Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation: Therapeutic Jurisprudence,
Miranda and Juveniles, 71 CIN. L. REV. 89, 94-95 (2002) (footnotes omitted); see also Simon & Rosenbaum,
supra note 80, at 35-37 (discussing the significance of voice in a TJ context in the related area of civil
commitment law).
248. PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 177, at 289-95.
249. Id. at 295-97.
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Court's dictates in Jones v. United States are anti-therapeutic; 2 5 0 and (4) TJ
principles must be more rigorously applied to issues involving post-acquittal
institutionalization and community monitoring.2 5 1
We must rigorously apply TJ principles to each aspect of the insanity defense.
We need to take what we learn from TJ to strip away sanist behavior, pretextual
reasoning, and teleological decision-making from the insanity-defense process.
This would enable us to confront the pretextual use of social-science data in an
open and meaningful way. 2 5 2
I have been critical of the ways that insanity acquittee release and recommitment
hearings have been conducted on issues ranging from the lack of adequate counsel,
to judges' perfunctory treatment of these matters, to the sanism and pretext
reflected in the positions of prosecutors in their efforts to oppose lessening
restraints or changing conditions of confinement or release.25 3 But, as I noted
above, it is not the insanity defense that causes these abuses, but rather the
administration of the post-insanity-defense-acquittal case disposition and institu-
251tionalization system.
So, if there is to be no insanity defense, then there will be no insanity-acquittal
release and recommitment hearings, as the cohort of defendants in question will be
in prison.
Scholars and practitioners, writing in the context of civil-commitment hearings,
have argued that that process had great therapeutic potential, reasoning that such
hearings are therapeutic because (1) they give patients an opportunity to present
and hear evidence in a meaningful court procedure,2 55 and (2) they can increase the
likelihood that any subsequent hospitalization and treatment will be successful. 2 5 6
This aligns perfectly with concepts of procedural justice, developed initially by
Tom Tyler and validated in empirical tests by Tyler and other researchers.25 7
Certainly, there is no reason to assume that this would be less likely to apply to
250. Id. at 297-99; see Perlin, Law of Healing, supra note 242, at 430 n.157.
251. PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 177, at 299-300.
252. Id. at 443.
253. See, e.g., Perlin, Misdemeanor Outlaw, supra note 10, at 236. See generally Perlin, Borderline, supra note
95; PERLIN, INSANITY DEFENSE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22.
254. See supra text accompanying note 198.
255. Perlin, Role and Significance of Counsel, supra note 24, at 742 (citing John J. Ensminger & Thomas D.
Liguori, The Therapeutic Significance ofthe Civil Commitment Hearing: An Unexplored Potential, 6 J. PSYCHIA-
TRY & L. 5, 8 (1978)).
256. Charles J. Kennedy, Judicial Behavior and the Civil Commitment Petitioner, in JUDGING IN A THERAPEU-
TIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS 159-63 (Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler eds., 2003).
257. E.g., Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications for Civil
Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433, 443 (1992); Michele Cascardi, Norman G. Poythress & Alicia Hall,
Procedural Justice in the Context of Civil Commitment: An Analogue Study, 18 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 731, 738-39
(2000). See generally PERLIN, PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY, supra note 84 (discussing the general relationship
between procedural justice and TJ).
2017] 513
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
cases involving insanity acquittees. But again, if the defense is abolished, then so
are these hearings.
On the question of whether the defense is consonant with TJ principles, consider
the words of the late Judge David Bazelon: "By declaring a small number not
responsible, we emphasize the responsibility of all others who commit crimes."2 58
Judge Bazelon concluded, in other words, that "the existence of the insanity
defense gives coherence to the entire fabric of criminal sentencing." 2 5 9 By
punishing defendants who are not responsible, "we diminish all the rationales for
punishment of the others whom we believe to be responsible for their crimes."2 60
Indeed, in Clark v. Arizona,2 61 which held that a state's insanity test that was
couched solely in terms of capacity to tell whether an act is right or wrong did not
violate due process,2 62 the Supreme Court came perilously close to condoning the
punishment of such non-responsible defendants. In criticizing that decision, I have
said:
Almost 25 years ago, Judge David Bazelon, writing in the American Psycholo-
gist, argued that the courts should "open the courthouse doors" to mental
health professionals, warning that they should "never hand over the keys."263
They may now not be slammed shut, but it is fair to say that after Clark, Judge
Bazelon's dreams have now been, for the foreseeable future, dashed.264
Certainly, the abolition of the insanity defense would both slam the door shut and
throw away the key.2 6 5
This becomes even more crucial when we consider the ways that individuals
with mental disabilities are treated in prisons. The description of an expert witness
in a prison double-celling case from twenty-five years ago-noting that "double-
celling" inmates with mental disabilities with non-disabled inmates in administra-
tive segregation was a practice akin to "putting the chickens in the fox's
lair" 2 66-iS yet another reminder of the sad reality of what happens to this
population in such settings.2 67
258. PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 177, at 293 (quoting DAVID L. BAZELON, QUESTIONING AUTHORITY:
JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL LAw 2 (1988)).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 293-94.
261. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006).
262. Id. at 742.
263. David L. Bazelon, Veils, Values, and Social Responsibility, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 115, 115 (1982).
264. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 14-1.2.8.
265. Beyond the scope of this Article is an analysis of the application of TJ to correctional facilities. See, e.g.,
Astrid Birgden, A Compulsory Drug Treatment Program for Offenders in Australia: Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Implications, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 386-87 (2008); sources cited supra note 240.
266. Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418, 424-25 (3d Cir. 1990).
267. For the earliest TJ-based analysis of the mental-healthcare needs of prisoners, see generally Fred Cohen
& Joel A. Dvoskin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Corrections: A Glimpse, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 777, 784
(1993).
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The need to retain the incompetency status is even more pressing in the cases of
criminal defendants with mental disabilities. Keri Gould, Deborah Dorfman, and I
have concluded that "[t]he perception of receiving a fair hearing is therapeutic
because it contributes to the individual's sense of dignity and conveys that he or
she is being taken seriously." 268 A defendant who cannot cooperate with his
counsel, who cannot understand the proceedings, will have no sense of dignity and
will not be taken seriously by the finder of facts or anyone else in the courtroom.
Tellingly, Minkowitz disparages TJ, alleging that it is "another variety of
therapy to be imposed on the person without his or her free and informed
consent." 2 6 9 There is not a shred of evidence in the TJ literature-indeed, she cites
270
none -supporting this position. Elsewhere, she argues that from the perspective
of a psychiatric-abuse survivor, "it is a concept to avoid," claiming that it
constitutes "handing over justice issues to professions (or even to a conceptual
framework associated with those professions) that have repeatedly violated trust
and perpetrated torture with drugs and electroshock and mind games of dominance
and control."2 71
I am utterly puzzled by this misstatement of what TJ is supposed to mean. There
are those who wrap themselves in the mantle of TJ while acting in ways that are
dissonant with TJ's principles and aspirations. There are certainly many judges
who, seeing themselves as "adjunct therapists," inappropriately trample upon
due-process rights in their quest to "do good." 2 7 2 I believe that the TJ community
needs to be more vigilant in "calling out" such rogue behavior.27 3 An excellent
starting point is Professor Ida Dickie's discussion of how a TJ emphasis on
procedural fairness and respect for autonomy can help all stakeholders in the
criminal-justice system.2 74
268. Perlin, Gould & Dorfman, supra note 189, at 114.
269. Minkowitz, Rethinking Criminal Responsibility, supra note 16, at 438.
270. Her only citation here is to a conversation that she had with a mental-health-rights lawyer some thirteen
years ago.
271. Minkowitz, Some Thoughts, supra note 16.
272. See Perlin, John Brown, supra note 237, at 449 (criticizing certain problem-solving courts that do not
follow TJ principles as "existing instead in a due process-free zone-implicitly rejecting the basic TJ 'premise
that therapeutic outcomes cannot trump due process' (quoting Perlin, No Trials Inside Eden, supra note 233, at
207)).
273. See ELEANORE FRITZE, SHINING A LIGHT BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: REPORT OF THE JACK BROCKHOFF
FOUNDATION CHURCHILL FELLOWSHIP TO BETTER PROTECT THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND DIGNITY OF PEOPLE WITH
DISABILITIES, DETAINED IN CLOSED ENVIRONMENTS FOR COMPULSORY TREATMENT, THROUGH THE USE OF INNOVA-
TIVE LEGAL SERVICES 51-54 (2015).
274. Ellen Waldman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Growing up and Looking Forward, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV.
345, 347 (2008) (discussing Ida Dickie, Ethical Dilemmas, Forensic Psychology, and Therapeutic Jurisprudence,
30 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 455 (2008)). Professor Dickie concluded that "the broader implications of the TJ Model
are that forensic psychologists may be able to practice within a legal system that respects an interdisciplinary and
psychologically oriented approach to the management of criminal behavior." Dickie, supra, at 460-61.
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In the same vein, the TJ community needs to focus on the connection between
TJ and international human-rights law. 2 7 5 I have called on TJ scholars to immerse
themselves in international human-rights law and have listed ten topics on which
they might focus their research.276 One of these was an investigation of "[t]he TJ
implications of instituting reform of forensic facilities."2 77 There is an array of
scholarship on the relationship between TJ and prisons and other detention
facilities, 2 78 but there is still perilously little on this topic. This is an area that calls
for new investigations and considerations.27 9
All these problems are exacerbated by the pervasive ineffectiveness of counsel
in cases involving defendants with mental disabilities in the criminal-justice
system. 28 0 In an article about the role of counsel in insanity and incompetency
cases, I listed multiple issues that, from a TJ perspective, needed additional
focus. 28 1 Consider this list, and think about the implications of what happens to
this population in prison settings where, in some nations, its access to lawyers will
be far less than it is even in forensic hospitals: 28 2
* If a defendant is, in fact, incompetent to stand trial, that means that he does
not have "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding" and[/]or a "rational as well as
275. For an excellent recent example, see Simon & Rosenbaum, supra note 80, at 36-41 (discussing the
international human-rights implications of involuntary civil commitment policies).
276. For the only important recent exception, see YA'IR RONEN, RE-UNDERSTANDING THE CHILD'S RIGHT TO
IDENTITY: ON BELONGING, RESPONSIVENESS AND HOPE (2016) (examining the identity issue through the prisms of
TJ and international human-rights law).
277. Michael L. Perlin, "The Ladder of the Law Has No Top and No Bottom": How Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Can Give Life to International Human Rights, 37 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 535, 542 (2014).
278. See, e.g., Astrid Birgden & Michael L. Perlin, 'Tolling for the Luckless, the Abandoned and Forsaked':
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and International Human Rights Law as Applied to Prisoners and Detainees by
Forensic Psychologists, 13 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 231, 234-35 (2008); Astrid Birgden & Michael
L. Perlin, "Where the Home in the Valley Meets the Damp Dirty Prison": A Human Rights Perspective on
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Role of Forensic Psychologists in Correctional Settings, 14 AGGRESSION &
VIOLENT BEHAV. 256, 257 (2009); Dirk van Zyl Smit, Regulation of Prison Conditions, 39 CRIME & JUST. 503
(2010); Cohen & Dvoskin, supra note 267; Ivan Zinger, Human Rights Compliance and the Role of External
Prison Oversight, 48 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 127, 127 (2006).
279. I emphatically disbelieve that the retention of the insanity defense and incompetency status will bring
about a more humane correctional system. I believe that their abolition will make an inhumane system even more
inhumane.
280. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "Too Stubborn to Ever Be Governed by Enforced Insanity": Some
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Dilemmas in the Representation of Criminal Defendants in Incompetency and
Insanity Cases, 33 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 475, 477-78 (2010) [hereinafter Perlin, TJ Dilemmas]; PERLIN,
HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 177, at 129-34. This criticism, of course, is leveled at practices in the United
States. I have worked on every continent and have heard similar stories from advocates in dozens of nations, East
and West, North and South.
281. See, e.g., Rebekah Diller& Emily Savner, Restoring Legal Aid for the Poor: A Call to End Draconian and
Wasteful Restrictions, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 687, 704 (2009) (noting that in many parts of the nation, those in
prison have "virtually no access to civil legal representation").
282. See id.
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factual understanding of the proceedings against him;" how can TJ prin-
ciples be invoked in such a case?
* If a defendant is initially found to be incompetent to stand trial, will the
lawyer act as most lawyers and consider him to be defacto incompetent for
the entire proceeding (as a significant percentage of lawyers do act for any
client who is institutionalized)?
* If a defendant is found to be incompetent to stand trial, will the lawyer
assume that he is also guilty of the underlying criminal charge?
* What are the issues that a lawyer must consider in addition to the client's
mental state in assessing whether or not to invoke an incompetency
determination?
* What are the TJ implications for a case in which the incompetency status is
not raised by the defendant, but, rather, by the prosecutor or the judge?
* Are there times when TJ principles might mandate not raising the incompe-
tency status (for example, in a case in which the maximum sentence to
which the defendant is exposed is six months in a county workhouse but is
in a jurisdiction in which IST defendants are regularly housed in maximum
security forensic facilities for far longer periods of time than the maximum
to which they could be sentenced)?
* What are the TJ implications of counseling a defendant to plead, or not to
plead, the insanity defense?
* Can a defendant who pleads NGRI ever, truly, "take responsibility?"
* Does the fact that the insanity-pleading defendant must concede that he
committed the actus reus distort the ongoing lawyer-client relationship?
* To what extent do the ample bodies of case law construing the "ineffective
assistance of counsel" standard established by the US Supreme Court in
Strickland v. Washington283 even consider the implications of TJ lawyering?
* To what extent does the pervasiveness of sanism make it obligatory for
lawyers in such cases to educate jurors about both sanism and why sanism
may be driving their decision-making, and to what extent should lawyers in
such cases embark on this educational process using TJ principles? 2 8 4
I believe that TJ requires a robust and expansive insanity defense.2 8 5 It demands a
reconsideration of policies that punish defendants for raising the defense, reject
testimony as to the causal relation between mental disability and the commission
of otherwise-criminal acts, and incarcerate "successful" insanity pleaders in
maximum-security forensic institutions for far longer than the maximum sentence
for the underlying crime, which is often a trivial one.2 8 6
283. 466 U.S. 668, 689-90 (1984).
284. Perlin, TJDilemmas, supra note 280, at 477-78.
285. See PERLIN, INSANITY DEFENSE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22, at 417, 419-37 (discussing how TJ can be
employed to "make our insanity defense system coherent").
286. TJ is also, in my view, the only option for changing the culture that condones the brutal treatment of
mentally ill defendants in prison settings.
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I am convinced, after spending over forty years representing and working
closely with persons with serious mental disabilities in the criminal-justice system,
that it is the only way that we can begin to eradicate the poison of sanism that
contaminates our criminal-justice system.
CONCLUSION
The issues that I discuss here have been addressed collaterally over the years, in
the context of arguments that seek to abolish involuntary civil commitment. 28 7 1
have never embraced those arguments, as appealing as they are on so many levels,
because of my fears that a large number of persons now subject to commitment
would be arrested and jailed on minor "quality of life" offenses. 288 Over thirty
years ago, in his response to Professor Stephen Morse's then-position that
commitment should be abolished,28 9 Andrew Scull wrote that "while Morse may
not balk at the prospect of sending the mentally ill to prison, a . .. system of justice
built around the concept of criminal responsibility almost certainly will." 2 90 I echo
Scull's concerns, noting that-given the kinds of charges that are often the subject
of incompetency-status inquiries and insanity defenses 29 1 -it is inevitable that this
population would wind up imprisoned in facilities in which multiple salient
articles of the CRPD would be violated, with impunity, on a daily basis, and in
which this group of individuals would suffer the wrath of sanism-inspired violence
on the part of correctional staff and other prisoners.
In short, I find nothing in the CRPD that requires the abolition of the insanity
defense or the incompetency status. Rather, I believe that when that document is
read as a whole-side by side with other international human-rights conventions
and covenants that require fair trials-it calls out for the retention of these
doctrines. The inevitable alternatives-consigning this population to the brutality
of prisons-are unspeakable. To return once more to the song lyric with which I
began my title, do we seriously believe that, had Abraham followed God's call, he
should have been consigned to prison for the rest of his life? In his definitive
encyclopedia on Dylan's music, Oliver Trager refers to Highway 61 Revisited as a
287. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment of the
Mentally Disordered, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 54, 54-57 (1982).
288. See generally Perlin & Lynch, Interactions with Police, supra note 237.
289. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 287. Morse subsequently modified his position in Stephen J. Morse,
Rationality and Responsibility, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 251, 267 (2000) ("I now believe that involuntary commitment
is theoretically justifiable for those whose general capacity for rationality is so impaired that they are not capable
of making rational decisions about their lives and not capable of living safely without treatment.").
290. Andrew Scull, The Theory and Practice of Civil Commitment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 793, 803 (1984). Scull is
a prominent historian of psychiatry. See, e.g., ANDREW SCULL, MADNESS IN CIVLIZATION: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF
INSANITY, FROM THE BIBLE To FREUD, FROM THE MADHOUSE IO MODERN MEDICINE (2015).
291. See supra note 164 (noting the proportion of insanity cases that involved death of the victim).
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"scathing, crystalline depiction of a modern-age nightmare."29 2 Trager certainly is
right about the song, and I believe that this description equally fits any depiction of
the treatment of persons with mental disabilities in prison. The disability-rights
community cannot, in good conscience, encourage the growth of that nightmare.
TJ demands that it be rejected.
292. TRAGER, supra note 41, at 252.
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